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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U ta_h 
I 
H. WILLIAM NALDER, CATHERINE I 
NALDER, H. WILLIAM NALDER, JF ... 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents} 
KELLOGG SALES COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and 
Appellant 
Case No. 8529 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Rule 75 (p) ( 2) specifies that the appellants' brief shall 
contain a concise statement of the facts of the case. It is sub-
mitted that the defendants' statement of facts is not concise, 
nor is it objective. Rather, it is, in many instances, misleading 
and argumentative. Attempts will not be made at this point 
to refute defendant's statement of facts. However, a brief 
reference to a deliberate attempt on the part of the defendani 
to belittle the plaintiffs must be mentioned. 
Repeatedly in the sixteen pages of the statement of facts 
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the defendant makes derogatory remarks concerning the plain-
tiffs, such as: ((Irregularities were discovered in their dealings," 
page 7; (('Mortgaged turkeys which had been wrongfully 
delivered to a service station operator," page 9; ((Involvement 
in litigation and poor paying record," page 10; ((could not 
secure financing from other sources," pages 11 and 12; ((bad 
credit rating and pending litigation," page 12; "lack of charac-
ter and poor reputation," page 12; ((false and incomplete 
credit information," page 13; ((confessed themselves as fail-
ures,'' page 7; and ((written confession of their wrongdoings," 
page 8. Such statements are not accurate, are taken out of con-
text, and are used only to emphasize the defendant's version 
of the testimony. No mention was made of the numerous 
reports \\'herein the plaintiffs \\·ere characterized as good turkey 
raisers having a good reputation, and instances where persons, 
relying upon the integrity of the plaintiffs, were willing to co-
sign on their obligations to enable them to secure turkey 
financing. Certainly such repeated repetition of this aspect of 
the case was only intended to emphasize part of the evidence 
and prejudice the court. It cannot be said to be part of a brief, 
concise and objective statement of facts, advising the court 
of the litigation. 
In other instances the defendant makes statements con-
sistent only with his theory of the facts, such as the importance 
of unreleased mortgages to the effect that the amount owing 
was the important factor, not the fact that they \vere unreleased. 
However, the record is clear that as to unreleased turkey chattel 
mortgages, no large feed company would advance financing 
until those tnortgages were released, since they purported to 
gtve a lien on after acquired turkeys (Tr. 120, 358, 382-3). 
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A similar statement is, ((The record is bare of any evidence 
that any demand was ever made for a release of the real estate 
mortgages." This again is seriously disputed, as will be shown 
in the balance of the brief. 
The lengthy statement of facts is resplendent with argu-
mentative statements. In fact, the normal statement of facts 
ends at the top of page 6, and continually thereafter, through 
page sixteen, the defendant proceeds to make statements con-
cerning the facts and argue the same. Such argumentative state-
ments involve the following: 
Discussion concerning the defendants demanding double 
security, page 6; authority of the defendant's agents, page 7; 
the number of turkeys the plaintiffs had and would raise, page 
7; threats made by the agents of the defendants concerning 
turkey financing after 1951, pages 8 and 9; information con-
tained in applications made by the plaintiffs to Ralston-Purina, 
page 13; language of the mortgages, page 14; no demands 
having been made for release of the~_.mortgages, page 14; the 
>o!, 
policy of the company and whether it acted in good faith, 
page 15. None of these involve a concise statement indicatiag 
a disputed issue, but rather they contain the theory and argu-
ments of the defendants. The case was tried before a jury. The 
plaintiff throughout the case and in his argument stressed his 
theory and the facts. The jury has determined those factual 
issues on competent evidence against the defendant. 
The plaintiffs submit the following statment of facts: 
During the years 1949, 1950 and 1951, to facilitate the 
raising of turkeys by the plaintiffs and the sale of the products 
of the defendant, the following chattel and real estate mort-
gages were executed and recorded: 
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Chattel Mortgages 
Exhibit A-1, March 9, 1949 ------------------------$24,000.00 
Exhibit A-2, January 22, 1950 -------------------- 23,300.00 
Exhibit A-3, March 26, 1951 -------------------- 42,825.00 
Real Estate Mortgages 
Exhibit A-7, September 14, 1949 ________________ 4,000.00 
Exhibit f\i.-8, April 1, 1950 ____ :_____________________ 6, 721.80 
Exhibit A-10, August 15, 1950 __________________ 6,555.12 
$107,401.92 
During 1948 and the first part of 1949, the plaintiffs in-
vested approximately $20,000.00 in building a brooder house, 
purchasing necessary equipment, etc., in contemplation of go-
ing into the turkey business (Tr. 308). 
Prior to 1949, the plaintiffs had brooded turkeys for others. 
The first year that plaintiffs raised turkeys financed by de-
fendant was 1949. Plaintiffs maintained that they were re-
quired by defendants to let the dealer of the defendant dispose 
of the turkeys financed by Kellogg, which resulted in con-
siderable freight and storage charges. If the plaintiffs had 
been permitted to sell the turkeys, as they desired, they would 
have paid the 1949 account in full and would have received 
approximately $800.00 (Tr. 65, 69, Ex. D-4). Due to a com-
bination of the freight and storage charges, a depressed market, 
and 29,000 pounds of turkeys allegedly becoming green 
struck (Tr. 217) because of improper transporting or storing 
of turkeys, the plaintiffs were only able to repay $17,891.24 
of the $23,518.63 advanced by the defendant. 
In 1950 and 1951 the plaintiffs were able to repay the 
an1ounts advanced on the chattel mortgages and applied a small 
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balance from each of three years to the obligation secured 
by the last real estate mortgage (Ex. E 4, 7) . To increase their 
volume and thus their profits, the plaintiffs had rented a 
brooder house, leased a 900-acre ranch, (Ex. J-8, Tr. 294) 
had purchased a tractor, combine and necessary equipment 
for planting and raising grain for feeding turkeys and were 
prepared to raise 14,000 turkeys in 1952 (Tr. 304, 306). The 
defendant advised the plaintiffs that it would not finance the 
plaintiffs for 1952, ( Tr. 74) so an application was not filed 
with the defendant for that year. However, applications were 
made to General Mills (Ex. F-1), Ralston Purina (Tr. 81), 
Farmers Grain Coop (Ex. H-1), and Pillsbury (Tr. 296) by 
the plaintiffs in an attempt to secure financing for raising 
14,000 turkeys in 1952 (Tr. 306). All of the applications, 
although recommended by the salesmen (Ex. H-1, F-1, Tr. 
96, 108) were denied when sent to the credit departments. 
When the first shipment consisting of 9,000 poults arrived, 
financing had not yet been secured, and, therefore, only 6,000 
turkeys were accepted (Tr. 82, 83). During the eight weeks 
the 6,000 turkeys were being brooded, continuous efforts were 
made to secure financing, without success (Tr. 207). The 
turkeys were then retaken by the hatchery (Tr. 306). There-
after an Ogden feed dealer co-signed with the plaintiffs at a 
bank in Ogden, which permitted them to raise a small number 
of turkeys in 1952 and again in 1953 and 1954 (Tr. 264). 
Applications for financing were made in 1953 to the feed com-
panies, but were again rejected. Repeatedly plaintiffs attempted 
to learn why their applications were turned down. Finally, 
early in 1954 when Mr. Boothe, the salesman for Ralston Purina, 
asked them to make an application for financing, they agreed 
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to, provided that if it were turned down the salesman would 
tell the~ the reason. In March of 1954 the plaintiffs were 
told that their application had been turned down because 
of unreleased mortgages (Tr. 268, 241), amounting to $107,-
000.00. At the time of the first trial the real estate mortgages 
had not been released, and the chattel mortgages were only 
released as a result of this lawsuit. 
The jury found that the defendant's wrongful failure to 
release the satisfied mortgages .. consisting of the three chattel 
mortgages and the first two real estate mortgages proximately 
contributed to the damage of the plaintiff. Damages were 
computed upon the cost, expense, sales price, mortality rate 
and average profit per turkey determined from the number of 
turkeys actually raised and applied to the number of turkeys 
the jury determined would have been raised. 
Since the argument of the case will require a detailed 
review of the evidence, additional factual matters will be 
referred to hereinafter. To better enable the court to under-
stand the evidence, most of '"hich is documentary, some of the 
exhibits are presented as an appendix to this brief. 
The brief of the defendant lists eleven points, some of 
which only incorporate arguments contained under other points. 
Upon analysis, it appears the eleven points will fall into the 
usual categories of liability~ proximate cause, damages and 
alleged errors at the time of the trial. Consequently, the plain-
tiffs shall ans\ver the arguments in that order, with a cross-
reference to the points urged by the defendant. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE: LIABILITY 
The Jury Found the Defendant Liable for Failing to Re-
lease Mortgages 
(a) All of the Chattel Mortgages Should Have Been Re-
leased (Defendant's Point III) 
1. 1949 Chattel Mortgages 
2. 1950 Chattel Mortgages 
3. 1951 Chattel Mortgages 
4. Demand for an additional $352 for 1951 
(b) The First Two Real Estate Mortgages Should Have 
Been Released (Defendant's Point II) 
(c) Demand was Duly Made for Release of Mortgages 
(Defendant's Points IV and V) 
(d) The Defendant Did Not Act in Good Faith in Failing 
to Release the Mortgages (Defendant's Point VII) 
(e) Agents of the Defendant Had Either Actual or Ap-
parent Authority to Represent the Defendant (De-
fendant's Point VIII) 
POINT TWO: PROXIMATE CAUSE 
The Jury Properly Found that the Defendant's Failure to 
Release the Mortgages was the Proximate Cause of Plain-
tiff's Damage (Defendant's Point VI) 
POINT THREE: DAMAGES 
The Law and Evidence Sustain the Jury's Determination of 
Damages (Defendant's Point IV) 
POINT FOUR: THE COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT 
H. WILLIAM NALDER, SR. AND JR. WERE PARTNERS 
AND, THEREFORE, THE JUDGMENT IN BOTH OF 
THEIR NAMES IS PROPER (Defendant's Points I and III (d) 
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POINT FIVE: THE COURT PROPERLY: 
(a) Received in Evidence Exhibits I-~' I-2, Q, R, & N 
1-4 (Defendant's Point V) 
(b) Denied Defendant's Motions for Directed Verdict 
' Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict, or for New Trial 
(Defendant's Point IX) 
(c) Instructed the Jury and Refused Certain of Defend-
ant's Requested Instructions (Defendant's Point X) 
(d) Disallowed Items of Defendant's Cost Bill on Appeal 
(Defendant's Point XI) 
CROSS-APPEAL 
POINT SIX: THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE 
JURY SHOULD BE DOUBLED PURSUANT TO SECTION 
57-3-8 UCA 1953 
POINT SEVEN: THE COURT IMPROPERLY AL-
LOWED ATTORNEYS' FEES ON DEFENDANT'S COUN-
TERCLAIM. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE. LIABILITY 
THE JURY PROPERLY FOUND THE DEFENDANT 
LIABLE FOR FAILING TO RELEASE MORTGAGES. 
(a) ALL OF THE CHATTEL MORTGAGES SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN R E L EASE D. (DEFENDANT'S 
POINT III). 
1. 1949 CHATTEL MORTGAGES. 
It is the contention of the Plaintiffs that the 1949 chattel 
mortgage was to be released in consideration of the Plaintiffs' 
executing the final real estate mortgage in August of 1950. 
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The Defendant contended there was no such understanding. 
The jury found this disputed factual issue in favor of the Plain-
tiffs. The facts leading up to the execution of the mortgage 
in August of 1950 will show the Defendant anticipated the 
deficit; requested a title search on the Plaintiffs' real property; 
prepared notes and mortgages in the exact amount of the deficit 
immediately after the deficit was determined; and instructed 
their local sales representative to secure the execution of the 
same. The sales representative secured the necessary signatures 
upon the representation that the new note and mortgage would 
take care of or pay the 1949 loss. More particularly, the facts 
are as follows: 
On March 22, 1950, after it was known that the 1949 crop 
of turkeys was being held in storage, a letter was written from 
the Credit Department of Kellogg Company to a Mr. George 
Vogel of the Omaha plant in which it was stated as follows: 
((We probably should have a real estate mortgage 
search made on this man to know who is holding the 
mortgage against his land, because there is going to be 
a deficit on the 1949 contract and we may want to get 
more security later on." (Ex. C-3, App. 2). 
After the entire proceeds of the 1949 crop consisting of 
$17,891.24 was paid to the Kellogg Company, the following 
letter was written by a representative of Defendant, M. Schinker 
to Mr. R. M. Scoville, the sales representative of the Defendant 
at Salt Lake City, Utah, dated July 28, 1950: 
CCWe have received a check on H. W. Nalder & Sons 
account in the amount of $17,891.24, to apply against 
their 1949 turkey account. This leaves a balance of 
$5,627.39 principal and interest of $927.73 to date. 
We are attaching notes on these two amounts and will 
appreciate it if you will obtain the signatures as we 
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have a 1950 contract with these people and will hope 
to obtain this money at the time they sell their 1950 
birds." (Ex. C 5, App. 4). 
On August 2, a letter was written to Mr. S. J. Quinney 
of Salt Lake City by Mr. W. H. Williams Jr., General Sales 
Manager, Omaha Plant of the Kellogg Company. After re-
ferring to a request for additional financing, mention was made 
of the 1949 deficit in the amount as quoted above, and Mr. 
Quinney was advised that notes securing those amounts were 
being sent to l'Jr. Scoville. It was suggested that a new mort-
gage also be secured. lvfr. Quinney v~-as advised of Mr. Scoville's 
address and \vas asked to contact him for the purpose of having 
the documents picked up and the signatures obtained thereon. 
In the letter it was stated as follows: 
((We are securing notes to cover these hvo items, but 
of course are depending on the second mortgage ·which 
we hold on Mr. N alder's home place as security to 
cover the indebtedness." (Ex. 7-5, App. 5). 
During the first part of August Mrs. N alder testified she 
had a conversation with Mr. Scoville regarding the execution 
of the real estate mortgage on their home. Mrs. Nalder testi-
fied as follows: 
A. He asked us if \ve would sign another mortgage and 
I told him: nNo". I said: ({You have more now on 
there than \Ye owe Kellogg Company" and he said: 
nWell, Mrs. Nalder," he said, HI£ you will sign 
this, this is \Yhat you now owe Kellogg, and if you 
will sign this one, we \Yill release all the others 
including the chattel mortgage for '49." * * * * 
(Tr. 215. Also see testimony of Mr. Nalder to the 
same effect: Tr. 61-62). No witness was called by 
the Defendant to refute the foregoing testimony. 
The Defendant either assumed that the 1949 chattel mort-
10 
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gage was released or should have been released and apparently 
was not relying upon it for an additional amount as a claim 
en after acquired property. In making a demand for $352.00, 
which will be discussed in detail hereinafter, the demand was 
specifically made with reference to the 1951 chattel mortgage 
(T. 205). Likewise, in January, 1954, in a letter to Ray, 
Quinney & Nebeker from Mr. W. H. Williams, Jr., General 
Manager of the Omaha plant, it was stated as follows: 
C(We are relying entirely on our real estate mortgage 
and for that reason, at this moment can release all the 
chattel mortgages which are unreleased at this time." 
(Ex. D-24, App. 26) . 
In Swaner v. Union Mortgage Company, 99 Ut. 298, 105 
P 2d 342, the court defined satisfaction of a mortgage as fol-
lows: 
etA mortgage (has been satisfied' when it has been 
terminated and the contract on which it was based has 
been rescinded * * * full satisfaction rna y be received 
in other modes than by payment of money' (Citation 
of authorities.) 
ct (Satisfaction' in legal phraseology (Imports a re-
lease and discharge of the obligation in reference to 
which it is given.' (Citation of authority.) (To satisfy' 
means (to answer or discharge, as a claim, debt, legal 
demand or the like.' (Citation of authority) * * * * 
The consideration for the mortgage having failed, the 
same was terminated and this termination satisfied 
(the mortgage'. (The holder of a mortgage renders him-
self liable for the statutory penalty for refusing to 
release a mortgage upon sufficient tender, although he 
claims that the tender is insufficient * * * ' " 
The Court instructed the jury in Instruction No. 2 fully 
concerning the theories of the parties regarding the release 
of the 1949 chattel mortgage. In Instruction No. 14 the Court 
11 
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instructed the jury concerning satisfaction of mortgages as set 
out in the preceding quotation from the Swaner case. The 
factual issue was therefore squarely and properly placed before 
the jury. The jury found in favor of the Plaintiffs and such 
finding must be sustained since it is clearly supported by com-
petent evidence. 
The turkeys and feed, purchased v~ith money advanced 
by Kellogg, were the chattels secured by the chattel mortgage 
of 1949. When the feed had been consumed and the turkeys 
sold, it was obvious there was no longer any security upon 
which the chattel mortgage could be operative. Having this fact 
in mind, even before the deficit vv-as determined, Kellogg be-
came interested in determining the status of the title on the 
real property. Just one day after the amount was received 
from the sale of the 1949 crops, notes were prepared to evidence 
the amount of the deficit, and four days later a letter was 
written to counsel in Salt Lake City, requesting that a mortgage 
be prepared to secure this deficit. Thereafter the salesman 
was sent to the home of Mr. and Mrs. Nalder to secure its 
execution. In order to secure its execution, he represented that 
the other mortgages would be released. Subsequent events on 
the part of the Defendant's company indicate that they did 
not rely upon the chattel mortgage for any additional pay-
ments but relied completely upon the real estate mortgage. 
Under such facts, it is clear that the jury's determination that 
the 1949 chattel mortgage should have been released, after 
execution of the real estate mortgage in August of 1950, is 
clearly supported by competent evidence. 
2. 1950 CHATTEL MORTGAGE 
The terms of the chattel mortgages specify as follows: 
12 
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"Provided, that if the mortgagor shall pay, or cause 
to be paid, unto Kellogg Sales Company, or its assigns, 
the indebtedness above set forth, * * * then this in-
strument shall be void, and otherwise in full force and 
effect." (Ex. A 1-3). 
The ledger sheet, Exhibit E-4, shows that the amounts 
advanced for 1950 were paid in December of 1950, and that 
$1,010.88 was transferred to the 1949 deficiency. A letter 
dated December 8, 1950, to H. Wm. Nalder, Jr. from M. 
Schinker of Kellogg Sales Company Credit Department, con-
firms payment in full for the 1950 advances. Under such cir-
cumstances, it cannot be serious maintained that there was not 
a duty to release that chattel mortgage. 
3. 1951 CHATTEL MORTGAGE 
The same type of chattel mortgage was involved here as 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph, which provides if the 
indebtedness is paid in full, the mortgage shall be void. Here 
again, the amount was paid in full as disclosed by the De-
fendant's own ledger sheets (Ex. E-5). The last sheet is marked 
paid on January 29, 1952, and shows $493_.31 was transferred 
to the 1949 deficit. A letter, (Ex. D-13, App. 13) dated Janu-
ary 30, 1952 to Mr. Nalder, Sr. and Jr. from Kellogg Sales 
Company, acknowledged receipt of the final payment for 1951 
and stated that they had applied $326.44 to principal, $447.69 
to interest, and the balance of $493.31 to the 1949 account. 
Again, it cannot be maintained that the 1951 mortgage should 
not have been released since it was paid in full. 
The defendant under Point III (b) alleges that the trial 
court committed error in permitting the jury to award damages 
against the defendant for failure to release chattel mortgages 
because each chattel mortgage secured the prior unpaid debt 
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of Plaintiffs, H. William Nalder, Sr., and Jr., which was not 
paid, hence no release could be demanded. 
To support this contention, the Defendant quotes from 
the chattel mortgages. The quotation does not support the 
assertion made, and is quoted out of context. In addition, the 
Defendant deleted part of the section quoted and failed to 
quote the balance of the sentence which clearly showed that 
the mortgage was restricted to future advances pertaining to 
the particular crop of turkeys then being financed. 
In context, the chattel mortgage after naming the mort-
gagor sets out the consideration clause as follows: 
(·for and in consideration of a sum estimated at 
$23,300.00 advanced or to be advanced for the purchase 
of turkeys, turkey poults, turkey feed, grain, insurance 
premiums, miscellaneous supplies * * * " 
The personal property then being mortgaged is described 
as all of the turkeys and turkey poults numbering approximately 
6,000 located in Davis County, Utah. 
The complete section from which the Defendant quoted 
and on which he was relying is as follows: (the part emphasized 
by the Defendant is italicized and the part deleted and omitted 
by Defendant is underlined) : 
nProvided that if the mortgagor shall pay or cause 
to be paid unto Kellogg Sales Company or its assi~s 
the indebtedness above set forth on demand as evi-
denced by his note or notes, together with interest as 
therein provided and shall further pay or cause to be 
paid such other further and future indebtedness 
whether evidenced by promissory note or not as th~ 
mortgagor may hereafter incur to the n1ortgagee, rt 
being the intent he1·eof to secut"e the said mortgagee 
any advance or rredit now made or hereafter nzade 
for the purchase of turkey poults, prepared turkey 
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feed and small grain, or any other advancements or 
credits extended in con'nection with the feeding, shelter, 
insurance and proper handling of said turkeys to ma-
turity or for market, * * * together with interest, if 
any, and shall fully and punctually perform all the 
covenants and agreements hereon contained to be kept 
and performed by the mortgagor, then this instrument 
shall be void, otherwise in full force and effect. 
The quotation refers to ((indebtedness above set forth" 
and ttsuch other further and future indebtedness." There is 
no reference to any existing or prior indebtedness. 
The material quoted by defendant does not sustain its 
contention that: 
ttThus by the very terms of these chattel mortgages, 
they were given to secure the existing indebtedness no 
matter how originating." (Defendant's brief, Page 27). 
The mortgages do purport to secure future advancements 
but those advancements are limited to funds extended in con-
nection with the raising of said turkeys to maturity. 
The provision clearly stated that upon payment of the 
indebtedness the chattel mortgage shall be void. The mort-
gages do not purport to secure past indebtedness or future 
indebtedness involving a different crop of turkeys in a sub-
sequent year. 
In Bank of Searcy v. Kroh, 114 S.W. 2nd 26, 194 Ark. 
785, the mortgage involved specified: 
((It is also understood and agreed that the foregoing 
conveyance shall stand as security for the payment of 
any extension or renewals * * * ; also as security for 
the payment of any liability or liabilities of grantor 
already or hereafter contracted * * * (Emphasis added.) 
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In spite of the language of the mortgage, the Court stated 
as follows: 
1951 
c tWhen a mortgage is given to secure a specific debt 
named, the security will not be extended as to an ante-
cedent debts unless the instrument so provides and iden-
tifies those intended to be secured in clear terms and 
J 
to be extended to cover debts subsequently incurred, 
these must be of the same class and so related to the 
pr!mary _debt secured that the assent of th·e mortgagor 
wtll be tnferred. The reason is that mortgages, by the 
use of general terms, ought never to be so extended 
as to secure debts which the debtor did not contemplate. 
It would be an easy matter to describe the nature and 
character of the debt so that the debtor and third parties 
may be fully advised as to the extent of the mortgage." 
(Emphasis added.) 
4. DEMAND FOR AN ADDITIONAL $352.00 FOR 
The Defendant maintains it was willing to subordinate its 
mortgages provided an additional $352 was paid for 1951. 
Further, the Defendant asserts that the Plaintiffs illegally sold 
and failed to account for turkeys in 1951. To determine if the 
Defendant rightly insisted upon the $352 payment and the 
validity of the other assertions requires a detailed review of 
the evidence. At the time the 1951 crop of turkeys was being 
processed, the Plaintiffs were offered approxin1ately 25 cents 
per pound for the nC" grade turkeys (Tr. 66). They, therefore, 
took the turkeys from the processing plant and disposed of 
them personally and through the Economy Market at Ogden, 
for 38 cents a pound (T. 67). After taking them from the 
processing plant, they were advised they should not have done 
so without permission from Kellogg. Consequently, the day 
after the turkeys were taken, Mrs. Nalder wrote a letter to 
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Kellogg advising them fully of what had taken place and the 
reason for taking the turkeys from the processing plant (Tr. 
67, 146). 
Although the Defendant asserts that the Plaintiffs illegally 
and wrongfully sold said nc grade turkeys," Mr. Williams, 
the Defendant's head representative, testified as follows: 
Q. I believe you stated that the grower rna y make his 
own arrangements for the sale of the turkeys? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Well, then, the Nalders did have the authority to 
remove the turkeys from Lee Brown's plant, HC" 
grade turkeys, and make other arrangements for 
sale of them, did they not ? 
A. That's true. (Tr. 465 and 466). 
Nevertheless, Mr. Williams told the Plaintiffs that the 
sale of the nC" turkeys was a penitentiary offense (Tr. 73, 
222) and a demand was made for the 315 ((C" grade turkeys 
at the rate of 42 cents per pound for the hens and 38 cents 
a pound for the toms, amounting to $2,130.06 (Ex. D-10, Tr. 
45 3). This price was recognized to be higher than the amount 
which could have been secured for sale of the turkeys as nC" 
grade turkeys (Tr. 453). 
Mr. Nalder made arrangements to borrow $1,250.00 and 
on January 21, 1950, sent the same to Kellogg Company (Ex. 
D-12). On January 30, 1952, a check for losses covered by 
insurance on the turkeys in the sum of $1,267.55 was re-
ceived by Kellogg, thus paying the 1951 account in full, plus 
t~. balance which was applied on the 1949 account. After re-
ceiving this latter check, Kellogg wrote to the Nalders as 
follows: 
((We wish to acknowledge receipt of the insurance 
adjustment in the amount of $1,267.44 which we have 
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credited to your 1951 turkey account, the 1951 interest, 
and we have credited the balance of $493.31 to you,. 
old account. The outstanding principal on the 1951 
account was $326.44 and the interest amounted to 
$447.69. {Ex. D-13) (App. 13). 
In spite of the fact that in the preceding letter, the 1951 
account had been paid in full and a balance of $493.31 was 
credited to the old account, they still insisted in the same 
letter than an additional $352 be paid on said etC" grade 
turkeys. 
On February 2, 1952, William Nalder, Jr. wrote to Mr. 
W. H. Williams, Sales Manager of Kellogg Company, Omaha, 
Nebraska, and mentioned that he had been informed by his 
father that Kellogg would not be financing them in 1952, and 
stated that arrangements had been made with another company 
for financing, provided they would be assured of a first lien 
to the extent of their advances. The Kellogg Company was 
advised that turkeys had been ordered and \Yere expected to 
arrive during the first week of March (Ex. D-14, App. 14). 
Upon receipt of that letter, an interoffice communication 
was sent from W. L. Aust, the Credit Manager of Kellogg 
Sales, to Mr. Williams, Plant Manager of the Omaha plant. 
The memorandum stated as follows: 
Attached is a copy of a letter received from Bill Nal-
der, Jr. I \YOuld like to tell him that we \Yill have to have 
the $352.00 for 1951 turkeys 'vhich he traded for the gas 
bill before \ve could agree to \Yrite such a letter. What 
do you think? I doubt that he can pay this but it might 
tl'ork.·'' (Ex. D-15, App. 15). (Emphasis added.) 
On February 18, 1952, Mr. Aust replied to Mr. Nalder's 
letter of February 2 and stated that a subordination agreement 
could not be granted until the $352 was paid. 
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Even though Mr. Aust, the Credit Manager, realized that 
the Nalders had received practically nothing from the raising 
of turkeys for three years, and that they vvere unable to raise 
$352, yet the Defendant insisted upon that payment, claiming 
that it was due for 1951. However, their letter and their ledger 
sheet discloses that the '51 balance was paid in full. Mr. Aust 
stated in his testimony that he was demanding the $352 as 
being owed on the 1951 obligation and not claiming it by 
virtue of the deficit for the 1949 chattel mortgage (Tr. 377-8). 
Since Mr. Nalder did not advise Kellogg of the company 
with whom they were dealing, as requested in the letter dated 
February 18, 1952, Kellogg Sales Company wrote the following 
letter dated February 26, 1952, to Farmers' Grain Company 
and apparently sent a copy of the letter to General Mills (T. 
129). The letter was as follows: 
((Gentlemen: We have recently had a request from 
Mr. H. William Nalder, Jr. to subordinate our lien 
which we have on his 1951 flock of turkeys. We have 
written to Mr. Nalder and notified him that upon receipt 
of his remittance of $352.00 we would agree to furnish 
a subordination agreement to cover the remaining bal-
ance for prior years, but we must have the 1951 account 
cleaned up. We also have asked Mr. Nalder the name 
of the feed company willing to finance him this season, 
but we have not received a reply to our letter. 
((We understand that you folks are contemplating 
financing his 1952 turkey program and we wish to 
notify you at this time that we still have a lien on his 
turkeys. If you have any further questions on this we 
would appreciate having you contact us." (Emphasis 
added.) (Ex. F-10, App. 17). 
After the first shipment of 9,000 poults arrived and finan-
cing had not been approved, Mr. H. William Nalder, Jr. on 
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March 2, 1952, sent the following telegram to Kellogg Sales 
Company: 
''~ alked Lee Brown, taking processing agreement, 
sendtng you $352.00. Said would but now says can't 
do for 60 days. My turkeys arrived 26th March (sic. 
February). Got one ton feed, can't get more till General 
Mills, 0 gden, Utah, Mr. Henry Stevens, receives sub-
ordination. Can you send subordination to General 
Mills. Wire if possible and receive submittance Brown 
60 days? My only possible way of raising it." (Ex. D-17, 
App. 18). 
In rely to that telegram, Kellogg Company wired to Wil-
liam N alder as follows: 
C<"J'.. T • f.. 
l ~eces~ary yen secure a letter frOE1 Lee Bro\vn agree-
ing to pay balance of $352.00 to us by-./\.pril 15, this 
year." (Ex. D-18, ./J.pp. 19). 
Attempts were made to secure the letter requested but 
Mr. Brown apparently changed his mind about making pay-
ment and therefore the application with General Mills was 
not granted since the subordination agreement was not issued 
(Tr. 302). 
After the hatchery had retaken all of the turkeys and all 
of the applications had been turned down, Mr. Nalder, Sr. on 
April 5, wrote to the Kellogg Company, and after mentioning 
that he had been unable to send the $352.00, stated as follows: 
"I have been fair and honest with your company and 
in all fairness I feel you should go along with me and 
help me to recover myself. I would like to put this 
proposition for your consideration. I would like to have 
2,000 turkeys to care for right around here. This is the 
best condition I have been in. I have a lot of equip-
ment. I want to stay in the business and not fail. I want 
to succeed and pay up \vithout having to sell my home. 
I have never dealt with anyone that I could not do busi-
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ness with them again. Please reconsider my. case and let 
me work out and regain my losses. _Give me a chance 
and I will not let you down. Please answer me back 
as soon as possible. Let it be favorable." (Ex. D-19, 
App. 20). 
In response to that letter, Kellogg Sales Company, through 
their credit manager, Mr. Aust, advised Mr. Nalder he would 
still have to pay the $352 (Ex. D-20, App. 21). 
Although Mr. Nalder had paid the $1,250.00 as agreed, 
and in spite of the fact that the 1951 account had been paid in 
full, the Defendant was insisting that Mr. N alder must pay 
the $352.00 before they would issue a subordination agree-
ment. Further demand was made for $352.00 in a letter on 
August 27, 1952 (Ex. D-21, App. 22). Demand was made in 
a letter on April 15, 1953, referring to the amount as ((the 
balance on the 1951 turkey contract * * * Also advise us when 
you will be able to pay the $352.00 to clean up the 1951 ac-
count." (Ex. D-22, App. 24). 
Similar language was used in a letter demanding the 
$352.00 dated June 4, 1953, wherein the balance was referred 
to as the t($352.00 which is the balance due on the 1951 turkey 
contract * * * . You agreed to pay this $352 balance on the 
1951 account * * * ." (Ex. D-23, App. 25). 
In a letter dated December 22, 1952, again demanding 
payment, it was stated: 
((As mentioned in our conference, on receipt of these 
remittances we will be in a position to furnish you 
with a subordination agreement allowing you to secure 
turkey financing elsewhere, inasmuch as our mortgage 
is still of record." (Ex. D 21-5, App. 23). (Emphasis 
added.) 
From the foregoing, the following is clearly established: 
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First, the 1951 loan was paid in full as shown by the 
ledger sheet of the Defendant and a letter sent to the Nalders 
(Ex. E-5, D-13, App. 13). 
Second, by withholding releases of the mortgage, the 
Kellogg Company was attempting to coerce an additional pay-
menta£ $352.00. 
Third, the Defendant knew that the unreleased mortgages 
would prevent the Plaintiff from securing financing from other 
sources (Ex. D-21-5, App. 23). 
Fourth, the Defendant knew of the Plaintiff's financial 
difficulties, but nevertheless flippantly insisted on the payment 
because, ((It might work" (Ex. D-15, App. 15). 
Fifth, the Defendant officiously wrote letters to other 
feed companies claiming a lien, and stating that the 1951 ac-
count had not been paid in full, directly disputing information 
in applications filed by the Plaintiffs (Ex. F-10, App. 17). 
Sixth, the Plaintiff did not illegally sell or fail to account 
for the 1951 turkeys, but rather advised the Defendants fully 
of the sale and borrowed money and paid the 1951 account in 
full. 
A conditional refusal based upon an invalid condition is 
still just a refusal. 
In Swaner v. Union Mortgage Company, supra, the mort-
gagee refused to release a n1ortgage even though it was unwill-
ing to advance the money secured by the mortgage. An FHA ap-
plication fee had been paid and fire insurance had been pur-
chased to cover the proposed home. The mortgagee 'vas insist-
ing upon being paid for those expenses before it would re-
lease the mortgage. The court, in determining that the mort-
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gagee did not have any authority to insist upon those conditions 
before the mortgage was released, stated as follows: 
((Appellant insists that the finding of the lower court 
that appellant refused to cancel the note and mortgage 
is erroneous because it specifically offered to cancel 
said note and mortgage provided respondent reimbursed 
it for certain expenses. We see no error in the finding. 
By its very argument appellant admits that its offer to 
cancel was conditional. An offer to cancel based on a 
condition is in reality a refusal to cancel together with 
a counter offer. If appellant had breached its contract, 
as respondent alleged, it was bound to cancel the note 
and n1ortgage and could not require respondent to 
fulfill further conditions * * * . 
((Appellants breach released respondent from the 
duty and appellant was wrong in refusing to release 
the mortgage in an attempt to compel payment." 
It is clear from the foregoing that all of the chattel mort-
gages should have been released. The 1949 balance was included 
in the August 1950 note and real estate mortgage. The 1950 
and 1951 accounts were paid in due course and therefore the 
mortgages should have been released at that time. 
(B) THE FIRST TWO REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN RELEASED (DEFENDANT'S 
POINT II). 
From September 14, 1949, to August 15, 1950, three real 
estate mortgages secured by the same property were issued by 
Mr. and Mrs. N alder to the Defendant as follows: 
September 14, 1954 ______________________ $4,000.00 
April 1, 1950 ---------------------------------- 6, 721.80 
August 15, 19 50 ---------------------------- 6, 55 5.12 
The first mortgage was issued to secure the advance of 
$2,000.00 by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs. The second mort-
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gage was in connection with the increasing of the primary 
loan on the home. The last mortgage was an incident of the 
1949 deficit. No advances were made by Defendant on the 
second mortgage. On July 27, 1950, the Defendant received 
the last payment for thel949 crop and determined the deficit 
(Ex. C-4, App. 3). On July 28, 1950, a promissory note and 
a letter were sent to the Defendant's agent, Mr. Scoville, at 
Salt Lake City, Utah (Ex. C-5, App. 4). On August 2, 1950, 
~~. letter was sent to Mr. Quinney with instructions to prepare 
a mortgage including the exact amount of the deficit plus a 
contemplated additional financing of $3,600.00 (Ex. C 7.5, 
App. 5). The conversation between Mrs. N alder and lvir. 
Scoville at the time the mortgage was executed has been pre-
viously set out in this brief. In essence, Mrs. Nalder protested 
signing the mortgage, but upon the assurances of Mr. Scoville 
that the other mortgages would be released, consented to sign 
the same (Tr. 60, 61, 215, 216). Certainly the normal inference 
from such a discussion would be that the prior chattel mort-
gage and the two earlier real estate mortgages 'Yould be merged 
in the final mortgage, being the exact amount of the deficit. 
Mr. Scoville was not called as a witness to refute this testimony 
concerning this conversation. 
In addition to the prior decision in this case by the Supreme 
Court, the following cases support the statement that a prior 
mortgage rna y be satisfied by the execution of a new mortgage 
if the parties so intend: 
First Nat. Bank of Jackson v. Reynolds, 143 S.W. 2d 721, 
283 Ky. 837. 
Benton Harbor State Bank v. Bubanovich, 242 N.W. 870, 
259 Mich. 150. 
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Duvall v. Duncan, 111 S.W. 2d 89, 341 Mo. 1129. 
Brady v. Selberg, 60 P. 2d 1104, 254 Or. 477. 
Subsequent transactions on the part of the Defendant 
indicate that they were relying solely upon the last real estate 
mortgage as security for the 1949 deficit. In a letter to Ray, 
Quinney and Nebeker from W. H. Williams, General Manager 
of the Omaha Plant of the Kellogg Company, it was stated 
as follows: 
C<W e are relying entirely on our real estate mortgage 
and for that reason can at this point release all the chat-
tel mortgages which are unreleased at this time. We are 
attaching releases for 1949, 50 and 51 chattel mort-
gages. * * * * 
The only real estate mortgage which is of record 
now1 we feel quite sure1 is the last one1 as you put it 
* * * (Ex. D 24, App. 26). 
It is obvious that the Defendant was of the opinion that 
it had released the earlier mortgages and was relying on the 
last one, as stated in the foregoing letter. In view of Mr. 
Nalder's testimony, the chronological sequence of the securing 
of the last mortgage which evidenced and secured the deficit 
of 1949, and the quotation from the foregoing letter, the jury 
was certainly justified in finding that the first two real estate 
mortgages should have been released. 
At no time did the Plaintiffs maintain that the August, 
1950 mortgage was not properly of record. If the three chattel 
mortgages and the first two real estate mortgages had been 
released as maintained by the Plaintiffs, there would have 
been mortgages of record totaling $15,5 55.12 consisting of 
the primary mortgage, which was originally in the sum of 
$9,000.00 and the second mortgage to the Defendant in the 
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sum of $6,555.12. A total mortgage indebtedness of $15,555.12 
secured by property valued at $35,000.00 to $45,000.00 (Ex. 
G-1 and G-5) would not have impaired the credit rating of the 
plaintiffs. In contrast, the record actually showed unreleased 
chattel and real estate mortgages amounting to $116,501.92 con-
sisting of three chattel mortgages and three real estate mort-
gages in favor of the defendant and the primary mortgage on 
the home in the amount of $9,000.00. 
The Defendant in Point II urged that the court com· 
mitted error in permitting the jury to award Plaintiffs damages 
for failure to release the real estate mortgages because the 
Plaintiffs never paid or otherwise discharged the obligations 
secured by said mortgages. That there was no duty to release 
any mortgages until the 1949 deficit was paid was vigorously 
argued upon the prior appeal. The Supreme Court answered 
such arguments as follows: 
nAppellant' s final contention is that respondents 
v;ere never entitled to have any of the mortgages re-
leased because the original 1949 debt, it contends, 
continued during the entire financial dealings of the 
parties. Such would be the case only if a merger was 
not intended by the parties upon the execution of sub-
sequent mortgages. The trial court found such a merger 
to have been intended, and his finding is well supported 
by the frank testimony of appellant's own witn~ss that 
it u·as the final real estate Jnortgage upon whzch the 
coJJl pany relied for security.',' 
In view of this decision, there can be no doubt but what 
on the same evidence the issue was properly submitted to the 
Jury. 
The Legislature has specified that when mortgages have 
been paid or satisfied they should be released. The jury found 
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that the 1949 chattel mortgage and the first two real estate 
mortgages should have been released having been merged into 
the final real estate mortgage as represented by the agent of 
Defendant. Even the Defendants cannot deny that the 1950 
and 1951 chattel mortgages were paid in full, and therefore 
should have been released. 
It is submitted that there is not only sufficient competent 
evidence to support the findings of the jury, but rather the 
evidence compels, in the light of legislative enactments, a 
determintaion that the Defendant had a duty to release the 
above mentioned mortgages. 
(C) DEMi\ND WAS DULY MADE FOR RELEASE OF 
MORTGAGES (DEFENDANT'S POINTS IV AND V). 
The two statutes pertaining to the releasing of chattel 
and real estate mortgages are as follows: 
Section 9-1-4 UCA, 1953 (chattel): 
((After the full performance of the conditions of the 
mortgage, any mortgagee, agent, assignee or legal rep-
resentative, who shall willfully neglect, for the space 
of ten days after being requested, to discharge the same 
shall be liable to the mortgagor or his assigns in the 
sum of $50 punitive damages and also for actual dam-
ages sustained by such neglect or refusal." 
Section 57-3-8 UCA, 1953 (Real Estate) 
((If the mortgagee fails to discharge or release any 
mortgage after the same has been fully satisfied, he 
shall be liable to the mortgagor for double the damages 
resulting from such failure. Or the mortgagor may 
bring an action against the mortgagee to compel the 
discharge or release of the mortgage after the same 
has been satisfied; and the judgment of the court must 
be that the mortgagee discharge or release the mort-
gage and pay the mortgagor the costs of suit, and all 
damages resulting from such failure." 
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From the foregoing statutory provisions, it is clear that 
a demand must be made for release of a chattel mortgage but 
that no demand is necessary for release of the real estate 
mortgage. , 
In spite of the fact that statute pertaining to real estate 
mortgages does not require a demand, the Defendant in its 
Point II claims the court committed error in permitting tht 
jury to award damages for failure to release real estate mort· 
gages because no demand was made. To support such a conten~ 
tion, the Defendant cites 56 ALR 3 3 7. The authorities relied 
upon for the statement in the annotati<?n are cases from only 
three jurisdictions, 11issouri, North Dakota and ~~ebraska. 
The laws of all three of those states specifically require a de-
mand or request and further provide for a time in which the 
demand or request must be satisfied. Clearly such statutes are 
distinguishable from the statute here in Utah. Two other states, 
New Mexico and New Hampshire, have statutes similar to the 
one in Utah. Neither of those two jurisdictions have held that 
a demand or request for release is a condition precedent to the 
bringing of an action under the statutes. 
Defendant cites the case of Shibata v. Bear River State 
Bank, 205 P. 2d 251, a Utah case~ inferring that a request or 
demand is necessary by the mortgagor before a penalty can be 
assessed under Section 57-3-8 UCA, 1953. In no place in the 
Shibata case does the court state or even imply anything about 
a demand or request for release. The facts of the case did not 
in any way give rise to the issue of a demand. 
The statute does not provide for a demand. That the 
legislature could have so provided is clear since such a provision 
is contained in the section dealing with chattel mortgages. 
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There are no Utah cases nor cases from other jurisdictions 
having a similar statute which in any way infer or state that 
a request or demand must first be made before the penalty 
of the statute may be imposed. 
The Defendant in its brief states as follows: 
''The record in this connection shows that no demand 
was ever made for the release of chattel mortgage until 
1954." 
Not only is this in dispute, but the record shows sufficient 
demands commencing in August of 1950. 
Previous reference has been made to the discussion in 
August, 1950, at the time of the execution of the last real 
estate mortgage. The Defendant secured the execution of that 
real estate mortgage upon the representation that the mortgages 
would be released. 
In 1950, Mr. Nalder, Jr. went to Omaha and paid the 1950 
account in full. At the time of that payment, he testified the 
following conversation was had with Mrs. Schinker, an agent 
of the Defendant: 
A. The check that I had taken back was for about 
$14,000.00, and she got out our account and went 
over it with me and said: ··This here pays your 
1950 account in full, and we'll apply $900.00 on 
your '49 account, which will take care of the in-
terest and leave a balance of some $300.00." Then 
she made a check out to me, and she says: .. I'm 
sorry that this isn't more" and I don't know just 
how I stated it, but the question of the mortgages 
being released was brought up, and she said: .. Mr. 
Williams is in Los Angeles, and we'll wait until 
he gets back before we release the mortgages." 
Q. Did you discuss with them the release of the mort-
gages? 
A. Yes." (Tr. 318). 
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Corroboration of Mr. Nalder's testimony that the mort-
gages were discussed is contained in a letter from Mrs. Schinker 
to Mr. Nalder, Jr., dated December 8, 1950, which refers to 
their meeting and further states: 
((Undoubtedly some satisfactory arrangements can 
be made for settling the balance due on your 1949 
account, but we will withhold releasing mortgages until 
we hear further from Mr. Williams." (Ex. C 10, App. 
8). . 
From the foregoing, it is clear that releasing of the mort-
gages was discussed and considered by the defendant on De-
cember 8, 1950, when the 1950 contract was paid in full, and 
that the Plaintiff was led to believe the release of the mortgage 
v1as imminent. 
On the same date that the letter was dictated to Mr. Nalder, 
Jr., fron1 Mrs. Schinker, Mrs. Schinker wrote a letter to Mr. 
Williams at Salt Lake City as follows: 
nThe attached copy of a letter to Mr. William Nalder 
will be self-explanatory. His 1950 account is all clear 
and he has paid the interest charges up to December 15 
on his 1949 account. 
((The principal on the 1949 account amounts to 
$6,627.39. He '\vas wondering what the interest rate 
would be. Since I was not sure \vhether it would be 
four, five or eight, I did not commit myself. 
rrw e ·will !lOt have any of the 11ZOFtgages released, 
either the cbattels or real eJtate .. until we have advice 
franz you." (Ex. C 9, App. 7). 
The Plaintiffs n1ade application to Pillsbury, Ralston Pu-
rina, General Mills, and Farmer's Grain Coop. for financing 
(Tr. 48, 15 5). The details of this matter will be discussed under 
Proximate Cause. As a result of a request from GeneralMills, 
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Mr. Nalder, Jr. called and wrote to Mr. Aust requesting co-
operation from Kellogg (Tr. 141, Ex. D-14, App. 14). 
In the letter it was stated as follows: 
nl understand from Dad that you will not be feeding 
us this year but that you would be willing to let another 
feed company do so, letting them have first lien to the 
extent of their services. I have arranged for some poults 
and a company to feed them providing they get con-
firmation from you that they will be assured of their 
money first. I would like to remain in turkeys if pos-
sible and try to clear off our outstanding obligations. 
((If such a satisfactory arrangement can be worked 
out with you people, I wish you would send me con-
firmation so I can turn it over to the feed company 
as that is the only thing holding it up and my turkeys 
are scheduled to arrive the first week in March." 
Although the letter does not, in the strict technical terms, 
make a formal demand for a release of prior mortgages, it is 
clear that the Defendant's attention was called to the problem 
of prior unreleased mortgages. 
Concerning these letters, Mr. Williams testified as follows: 
Q. All right. He was calling attention then to his prior 
accounts, was he not? 
A. Oh, surely. 
Q. And to go ahead and finance with other companies, 
he could be permitted to do so by one or two ways, 
either a release of the mortgage or a subordination 
agreement, is that true? 
A. That is true. 
Q. And your attention then was directed to the propo-
sition of the unreleased mortgages, was it not, by 
that type of letter? 
Mr. Bowen to witness: You may answer, if you know. 
A. Yes." (Tr. 346, 347). 
Mr. Aust, the credit manager, testified as follows: 
Q. (Reading) C(As mentioned in our conference, upon 
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receipt ?f these remittances we will be in a position 
to f~rntsh you with a subordination agreement al-
~owtng you to secure turkey financing elsewhere 
Inasmuch as our mortgage is still of record." 
Now the question again was do you recall discuss-
ing the subordination agreement or mortgages in 
that conference? 
A. Subordination agreement, yes. 
Q. This would recall to your mind the fact the mort-
gages were still of record, would it not? 
A. Yes. 
* * * * Q. Would that have called your attention to unreleased 
mortgages? 
A. I believe it \vould, yes." (Tr. 401, 402). 
Under statutes requiring demand, the courts have con-
sistently held that the request need not be L.1 any particular form 
and that no formalities are required. It need only call the 
mortgagee's attention to the fact that the indebtedness has 
been paid and the request for satisfaction has been made. In 
56 ALR 33 7 it is stated: 
ttA demand to satisfy is sufficient which calls to the 
attention of the mortgagee the fact that the indebted-
ness secured by the mortgage has been paid and re-
quests, in consideration of that payment, that satisfac-
tion of the mortgage be made, under a statute which 
requires the discharge tat the request of the person 
making satisfaction,' without otherwise prescribing the 
form or substance of the request. Barnett v. Bank of 
Malvern {1928)-Ark. 4 S.W. 2d 17. 
ttThe request under such statute may be either oral 
or written. Ibid. 
nAnd, although the request need not be presented 
in any particular form, yet the language in its fair and 
reasonable meaning must inform the mortgagee as to 
what is desired. Jordan v. Mann ( 1877) 57 Ala. 595. 
ttThe fact that the mortgagee did not understand 
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the notice as a request to enter satisfaction will not 
excuse his delinquency, if the reasonable intendment 
of the request conveyed a desire for satisfaction. Ibid.'' 
In 59 C.J.S. 746, it is stated: 
((No particular form of words is necessary for this 
demand; it is sufficient if it informs the mortgagee with 
reasonable certainty that an entry of satisfaction of 
the particular mortgage is requested. * * * * 
The unreleased chattel mortgages purported to mortgage 
after acquired property, and therefore there was a question, 
recognized by Kellogg, of whether the company currently 
financing would have a first lien on the turkeys. Under such 
circumstances it was necessary that either the mortgages be 
released or a subordination agreement would have to be given 
by the Defendant. It is clear that the Defendant was aware of 
the prior unreleased mortgages and their effect upon the Plain-
tiffs' ability to secure additional financing. On January 30, 
1952, Mr. Ault, the credit manager, wrote to H. W. Nalder, 
Sr. and Jr., acknowledging payment in full on the 1951 account, 
but nevertheless stated as follows: 
((We are awaiting the remaining balance for the 1951 
turkeys which were sold locally. We understand that 
Bill traded $352 worth of turkeys to take care of a 
gasoline bill, and of course, inasmuch as we had a mort-
gage on these turkeys, that amount must be remitted 
to us together with the remaining balance as discussed 
with Mr. Williams recently. We would appreciate 
having these funds forwarded to us so that we would 
be able to release the mortgage and return the notes 
to you. Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated." 
(Emphasis added.) (Ex. D 13, App. 13). 
On February 18, 1952, the Defendant wrote to Mr. Nalder, 
Jr. in replying to his letter of February 2, advising him that 
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until the $352 was paid a subordination agreement could not 
be given. (Ex. D-16, App. 16). 
Again on December 22, 1952, the Defendant wrote to 
Mr. N alder stating as follows: 
((As me.ntioned in our conference, upon receipt of 
these ~emtttances we will be in a position to furnish 
you wtth a subordination agreement allowing you to 
secure turkey financing elsewhere inasmuch as our 
mortgage is of record.n (Ex. D 21-5, App. 23). 
There is no question but what the credit manager of 
Kellogg knev1 that the mortgages were still of record and t.~at 
those mortgages \vere preventing and prohibiting the Plaintiffs 
from securing financing. Requests by the Plaintiffs to the 
Defendant that others be permitted to finance the Plaintiffs 
certain! y amounted to a demand for release of the mortgages 
since they had been paid or had been merged into the last real 
estate mortgage. 
In August, 1950, a conversation \Vas had with reference 
to merging the 1949 obligations into the last real estate mort-
gage. In Decen1ber of 1950, Bill Nalder paid off the 1950 
account and had a discussion with an agent of the Defendant 
pertaining to the release of mortgages. At the end of the year 
19 51 a conversation was had at the Hotel Utah wherein sub-
ordination of the Kellogg· s claims to that of other companies 
was discussed. Letters, telegrams and telephone calls were 
made during the first t\\'O n1onths of 1952 requesting permis-
sion for other con1panies to finance the Plaintiffs; yet in spite 
of all this evidence, the Defendant contends the record is with-
out dispute uthat no demand was ever made for the release 
of the chattel mortgages until the end of 1953 or early 1954." 
It is submitted that repeated demands were n1ade calling to 
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the attention of the Kellogg Company the fact that the mort-
gages were not released and should have been released. 
Demands made during January, February and March, 
1954, for release of the 1951 chattel mortgage are con-
tained in correspondence between Ralston-Purina Company 
2nd the Defendant. On January 28, 1954, Ralston-Purina Com-
pany wrote to the Kellogg Sales Company inquiring if Kellogg 
was willing to release the 1951 chattel mortgage (Ex. G-6, 
App. 27). Mr. Aust of Kellogg Company advised them that 
the mortgages had been released. Ralston on February 5, 1954, 
wrote the County Recorder for confirmation. The County Re-
corder replied that the mortgage had not been released as of 
February 7, 1954 (Ex. G-7, App. 28). Again on March 4th 
Ralston wrote to Mr. Aust stating that, although they had been 
informed that the mortgages had been released, the public 
record did not so indicate (Ex. G-8, App. 29). Mr. Aust replied 
on March 8th that releases had been prepared on January 21, 
but since the account was involved in litigation, the releases 
had been forward to counsel rather than to the recorder (Ex. 
G-9, App. 30). 
The three chattel mortgages were finally released on 
March 11, 1954, after this law suit became imminent (Ex. 
A 4, 5 and 6). 
It is a well recognized rule of law that the law does not 
require useless and needless acts. It is obvious from the position 
of the Defendant that demands would be just such an occur-
rence. It was clear after February 18, 1952, a request for release 
of the mortgages or subordination would be futile unless the 
$352.00 payment was made (Ex. D-16, App. 16). In view of 
the company's policy, it is likewise clear that the demand for 
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release of the mortgages would be a futile gesture. Mr. Wil-
liams, the plant manager at Omaha, testified that it was a policy 
of the company to never release a mortgage as long as there 
was any outstanding indebtedness. He testified as follows: 
Q. Mrs. Schinker would discuss with you the problem 
of releasing this mortgage, would she not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did she ask you? 
A. I received a copy of the letter which she sent out 
and subsequent! y I told her we would not release 
the mortgage. 
Q. You told her you would not release the mortgage? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What mortgage were you talking about? 
A. All existing mortgages at that time." (Tr. 342, 343). 
Under such circumstances the Plaintiffs \Vere clearly not 
required to make any further demands for release of mortgages 
after February, 1952. By statute, no demand is required for a 
release of real estate mortgages. Numerous demands were made 
to facilitate the financing of turkeys wit.~ other companies. 
Refusal to release the mortgages was consistently made by con-
ditionally offering to subordinate provided an additional pay-
ment of $352 for 1951 was made. Since the 1951 contract 
had been paid in full, the mortgages should have been released. 
(D) THE DEFENDANT DID NOT ACT IN GOOD 
FAITH IN FAILING TO RELEASE THE MORTGAGES. 
(DEFENDANT'S POINT VII). 
It is stated by Defendant that since Mr. Williams was 
acting upon advice of counsel the company was therefore acting 
ing good faith. It is also stated that there is no other evidence 
on this matter except the testimony of Defendant's witnesses. 
The record will disclose nine instances where the Defendant 
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company was not acting in good faith but rather went out of 
its way to the detriment of the Plaintiffs. 
1. At the conversation of Hotel Utah previously referred 
to, Mrs. N alder testified the following was stated: 
A. He said: CtDo you folks know you could have went 
to the penitentiary for taking those $352.00 worth 
of turkeys?", and he said: CCI will not feed you or 
let anybody else feed you,'' and I said, c (Then how 
can we pay Kellogg?", and he said: CtThat' s up 
to you. That's your hard luck." (Tr. 222). 
She further testified that the discussion became very heated 
and they became a little angry. Testimony to the same effect 
was given at Pages 151 and 73 of the transcript. 
That threat was carried out as will be shown by the other 
matters discussed under this sub-paragraph. 
2. After Bill Nalder had written his letter of February 2, 
1952, requesting authorization for another feed company to 
finance them, the following inter-office communication was 
sent by the credit mangaer to the plant manager: 
(]would like to tell him that we will have to have the 
$352.00 for 1951 turkeys which he traded for the gas 
bill before we could agree to write such a letter. What 
do you think? I doubt if he can pay this but it might 
work." (Ex. D 15, App. 15). (Emphasis added.) 
3. Thereafter, the Defendant continually insisted upon 
the $352.00 payment even though their own letters and ledger 
sheet acknowledged that they had been paid in full for 1951. 
(Ex. D-16, D-20, D-21, D-21.5, D-22, D-23, App. 16, 18, 
21, 22, 23, 24 and 25). 
4. When the Defendant was not advised by the Plaintiffs 
as to what companies were considering financing them, they 
wrote the following officious letters to Farmers Grain Com-
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pany and apparently sent a copy to General Mills (Tr. 129). 
The letter is dated February 26, 1952: 
((Ge~t~emen: We recently had a request from Mr. 
H. Wllham Nalder, Jr., to subordinate a lien which 
we have on his 1951 flock of turkeys. 
((We have written to Mr. Nalder and notified him 
that upon receipt of his remittance of $352.00 we 
would agree to furnish the subordination agreement 
to cover the remaining balance for prior years, but we 
must have the 1951 account cleaned up first. We also 
asked Mr. Nalder the name of the feed company that 
intended to finance him for this season but as yet we 
have not received a reply to our letter. (Emphasis 
added.) 
'''}l e t~nderstand that you folks are contemplating 
financing his 1952 turkey program and ;'/e wish to 
cotify you at this tune that v;,Te still have a lien on his 
turkeys. If there should be any further questions on 
this we would appreciate having you contact us." (Ex. 
F 10, App. 17). 
From the foregoing letter, it is obvious that they did not 
know the nan1e of the feed company intending to finance the 
Plaintiffs. Also, it is obvious that the statement to the effect that 
Defendant still had a lien on the 1951 flock of turkeys for 
failure to make payment of $352.00 on the 1951 account, 
would be in direct conflict with the application of the Plaintiffs, 
since they represented that the 1951 season had been successful 
and the amount paid in full. The effect of such a letter sent 
to a business contemplating granting credit would only result 
in the disapproval of the application. Certainly the Defendant 
went out of its \Yay in writing the letter knowing that the 
result would be to prevent financing by other companies. 
5. The Defendant openly admitted that they insisted upon 
double liability when additional financing was granted. The 
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first real estate mortgage was for $4,000.00 even though only 
$2,000.00 was advanced. In addition to testifying as to such 
a policy, Mr. Williams wrote to Mr. Quinney, August 2, 1950, 
and stated as follows: 
ttlt has been our custon1 where additional finance 
vv-as required to require security at the rate of two for 
one. In other words, $2.00 worth of security for each 
$1.00 furnished on additional finance. * * * 
rrwe may be entirely off the beam in drawing a mort-
gage for an amount larger than we expect the account 
to become, but we feel that it is some protection to have 
a recorded amount in that figure, and if by some extreme 
it was necessary to advance more than was originally 
requested, there would not have been an opportunity 
for the grower to have placed another mortgage, which 
would come in between the mortgage we might file now 
and another one some 60 to 90 days later. You might 
advise us as to this procedure. We understand that 
in most states the mortgage has to be backed up by 
notes but of course we would never attempt to collect 
any more than the account actually amounted to re-
gardless of the size of the mortgage." (Ex. C-7.5, 
App. 5). (Emphasis added.) 
6. Bill Nalder testified that at the time the 1950 payment 
was made he was advised the mortgages would be released 
after the return of Mr. Williams (Tr. 318). Mrs. Schinker 
of Kellogg Company wrote to Mr. Nalder confirming that the 
mortgages would probably be released after consultation with 
Mr. Williams (Ex. C-10, App. 8). However, in an interoffice 
letter it was clearly stated that the mortgages would not be 
released until ordered by Mr. Williams (Ex. C-9, App. 7). 
Mr. Williams ordered that the mortgages not be released since 
it was the policy of the Company never to release a mortgage 
as long as there was an unpaid balance. This policy was never 
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communicated to the Plaintiffs; rather, they were lead to believe 
that release of the mortgages would be taken care of in due 
course. 
7. There is no question but that the Defendant knew that 
as long as the mortgages were unreleased the Plaintiff would 
not be able to secure financing. Mention of this fact was made 
in their letter of December 22, 1952 (Ex. D-21.5, App. 23). 
Mr. Aust, the credit manager, testified that he knew it was a 
policy of the large feed companies not to finance a grower as 
long as there was a prior unreleased mortgage of another feed 
company (Tr. 382-4). Mr. Williams testified that his com-
pany, as well as other companies, would not grant financing 
without securing releases of prior turkey mortgages because 
they purported to give a lien on future acquired turkeys (Tr. 
358, 465). 
8. The correspondence between Ralston-Purina Company 
and the Defendant during the first months of 1954 pertaining 
to a request that the 1951 mortgage be released has been 
referred herein. The dilatory and irresponsive lack of concern 
on the part of the Defendant certainly did not show good faith. 
(See Ex. G-6, 7, 8 & 9, App. 27 to 30). 
9. Upon receiving a letter from Ralston Purina Company, 
Exhibit G-6, App. 27, the credit manager for the Defendant 
called a representative of Ralston Purina at St. Louis. The 
letter merely asked if the Defendant was willing to release 
the mortgage. Nevertheless the agent of the Defendant pro-
ceded to tell the credit manager for Ralston Purina his personal 
opinion of the Plaintiffs. A report of the call ":-as as follows: 
''The credit n1an who called us (whose name I didn,t 
catch) was personally acquainted \Yith the Nalders. He 
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I~ 
~: 
certainly did not have a very high opinion of the Nalders 
and referred to Mrs. Nalder as the (troublemaker.' ,. 
(Ex. G-10, App. 31). 
Not only did the Defendant refuse to release the mort-
gages, they threatened to prevent the plaintiffs from obtaining 
financing elsewhere, flippantly insisted that $352.00 be paid 
before a subordination agreement would be granted since 
((it might work," wrote officious letters misrepresenting the 
facts to other feed companies, lightly den1anded double security 
for additional financing, lead the Plaintiffs to believe the mort-
gages would be released while the company policy was com-
pletely opposite; exercised dilatory practices in releasing the 
n1ortgages even . after suit was threatened and, finally, went 
out of their way to advise the credit man of another company 
that the Plaintiffs could not keep their promises; had failed 
to account for turkeys; that they were troublemakers; and that 
Defendant would not finance them. Rather than showing good 
faith, the conduct of the Defendant was willful, wrongful, 
and even malicious to an extent sufficient to sustain punitive 
damages regardless of the statute specifying double damages 
for failure to release the mortgages. 
The issue of whether the defendant acted in good faith 
is a question of fact for jury determination. The Court, by In-
struction No. 17, instructed the jury ((that there can be no 
recovery of damages * * * * if the mortgagee mistakenly, 
but honestly, and in good faith" failed to release said mort-
gages." The jury found this factual issue against the defendant. 
The foregoing evidence is more than adequate to justify the 
submission of that issue to the jury and to sustain the verdict 
on that issue. 
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In Malarkey vs. O'Leary, 256 Pac. 521 (Oregon), the 
court said that where the mortgagee refused to release the 
mortgage after it had been paid because the mortgagor owed 
another debt to him, that this was no defense to the action even 
though the mortgagee acted in good faith. The court stated: 
((He {the defendant) also claims that the answer 
is sufficient, because it shows that the defendant was 
acting in good faith, and under honest belief that he 
was not required to satisfy the mortgage until payment 
of the sum mentioned in the answer. But his good faith 
is no defense. Although the statute is penal in its 
character, the good faith of the mortgagee in refusing 
to cancel a mortgage of record will constitute no de-
fense to an action brought to recover the penalty pro-
vided for in the statute, after the terms and conditions 
of the mortgage have been admittedly complied with." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Defendant in this case refused to release the mortgages 
in an attempt to coerce the Plaintiff into paying an additional 
payment. According to the Oregon case such conduct cannot 
constitute a good faith defense. 
In Swaner v. Union Mortgage Company, supra, the court 
discussed the question of good faith when the refusal to release 
the mortgage is made to coerce an additional payment. The 
court states as follo"~s: 
((The evidence in the record indicates that appellant 
refused to advance money under the contract in an at-
tempt to force payment on another contract. And ap-
pellant offered to release the mortgage only if re~­
bursed for its expenditures, although by its own act tt 
had breached the contract and made it impossible for 
respondent to proceed. Appellant failed to establish 
that it acted in (good faith' in refusing to release the 
mortgage. 
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nA party who contracts to lend money to another 
to build a house, taking a mortgage thereon as security, 
observes the other party spend money and time and 
perform as agreed, it refuses for reasons of coercion 
connected with another matter to advance money as 
agreed, can hardly insist that he acted in entire good 
faith and should therefore be protected from payment 
of certain damages.'' 
The Defendant asserts that the penal provisions of the 
statute should not be applied because the Defendant was acting 
in good faith. To support this contention, the Defendant cites 
the case of Shibata v. Bear River Bank, supra. It is true the 
Utah court adopted the good faith rule in th~t case, but it was 
based upon the fact that the mortgagee was acting in good 
faith ''because he believes there has been no full satisfaction,'' 
or because he ''honestly thinks that it had a valid and subsisting 
mortgage against appellant which had not been satisfied." In 
this case the Defendant cannot claim that it thought it had 
valid and subsisting mortgages, since its own documents showed 
payment in full and since the Defendant refused to release 
the mortgages because it was the policy of the company to 
never release any mortgages so long as there was an unpaid 
balance. There could be no good faith assertion that the De-
fendant thought the 1950 and 1951 chattel mortgages were 
valid and subsisting. Kellogg's own ledger sheets and corres-
pondence show that those obligations had been paid in full. 
The distinction that the good faith must be a belief that there 
had been no full satisfaction is supported by the numerous 
cases cited in the annotation in 56 ALR 345. The good faith 
necessary is a good faith belief in the proposition that the debt 
secured by the mortgage has not been paid. It would be easy 
to circumvent legislative intent by merely claiming good faith 
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because counsel advised Defendants to follow a given course of 
conduct. The statute clearly specified what should be done 
when a mortgage is satisfied. Defendant cannot escape liability 
by claiming that they were advised to ignore the provisions 
of the statute. Such: is not the good faith intent necessary to 
escape the provisions of the statute. 
(E) AGENTS OF THE DEFENDANT HAD EITHER 
ACTUAL OR APPARENT AUTHORITY TO REPRESENT 
THE DEFENDANTS. (DEFENDANT'S POINT VIII). 
Previous reference has been made to the conversations had 
with Mr. Scoville, Mrs. Schinker and the credit manager, Mr. 
Aust. Mr. Scoville was directed to take the notes and mortgages 
and have them executed by the Nalders after the deficit in 
1949 was established. Letters Exhibits C-4, C-5, C-8, Appendix 
3, 4 & 6 are directives from the Defendant to Mr. Scoville 
concerning this matter. In a letter of August 2, 1950, Mr. Wil-
liams, the plant manager, advised Mr. Quinney to contact Mr. 
Scoville for the purpose of having the mortgage signed (Ex. 
C-7.5, App. 5). 
Mrs. Schinker had authority to receive the money, so it 
would appear that she had some authority to discuss the re-
leasing of the mortgages upon payment in full. Mr. Williams 
admitted that she was familiar with the policy of the company 
regarding releasing mortgages and had authority to discuss 
such policy (Tr. 340-3). Mr. Aust in his letters stated that 
upon payn1ent of $352.00 the mortgages would be released 
(Ex. D-13, App. 13 and Ex. D-21.5, App. 23). Again Mr. 
Williams admitted Mr. Aust as credit manager had a respon-
sible position with the company, and was familiar with the 
policy of the company (Tr. 336-7). Although the employees 
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freely discussed the matter of releasing the mortgages, it now 
appears from the testimony of Mr. Williams that he was the 
only one with authority to release mortgages. If the agents did 
not have actual authority, certainly they had apparent authority 
so far as the plaintiffs were concerned. Representatives of the 
Defendant who requested execution of the mortgagees re-
ceived the money paying the contract in full; discussed and 
insisted upon payment of additional amounts before mortgages 
would be released, must have had some authority. 
According to 59 C.J.S. 756, a demand may be served on 
an agent or clerk of the mortgagee, in which case it will be 
sufficient if such person had authority to receive it, or if knowl-
edge of it is brought home to the mortgagee. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In Scoville v. Kellogg, 1 Utah 2d 19, 261 P. 2d 933, the 
Defendant attempted to disclaim liability on a bonus arrange-
ment with its salesmen on the ground that its representative 
did not have authority to bind the Defendant. The court held 
it was error to strike the representative's testimony since he had 
executed a written bonus plan and had sent correspondence 
concerning bonus payments. 
In the present case the Plaintiffs were dealing with repre-
sentatives who were signing application, receipts for payment, 
and making written demand for payments in which they stated 
that, upon receiving said payments, mortgages would be re-
leased. 
In each case, before any conversation involving Scoville 
or Mrs. Schinker was permitted, Mr. Williams was called out 
of order and testified concerning their positions with the De-
fendant company. (Scoville, Tr. 44-54; Schinker, Tr. 313-
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317) . The court gave careful consideration to Defendant's 
claim of lack of authority before such evidence was admitted. 
These representatives had sufficient authority to receive 
and transmit a demand for the release of the mortgages to an 
agent of the Defendant who did have authority. Mr. Williams 
was advised of Mr. Nalder, Jr.'s letter requesting authority 
for financing by another company. Mr. Williams was advised 
by Mrs. Schinker that the 1950 account had been paid in full 
and that mortgages would not be released until so advised 
by him. When asked what advice was given to Mrs. Schinker, 
Mr. Williams said, CCYes, I told her we will not release the 
mortgage" (Tr. 342). It was admitted that Mr. Williams 
had authority to release the mortgages. Even after an agent of 
the Defendant with authority received the information, it 
appears that there was no intention of releasing the mortgages 
since it was stated emphatically that it was the policy of the 
company not to release any mortgages so long as there was an 
unpaid balance. Even if the agents did not have authority 
to actually release the mortgages, they had authority to discuss 
the matter with the plaintiffs and to communicate those matters 
to persons with authority. As far as the plaintiffs were con-
cerned, they were dealing with people acting 'vithin the scope 
of their employment concerning n1atters \vhich the agents were 
directed to discuss \vith the plaintiffs and, therefore, they were 
justified in assuming that the agents had actual authority even 
though it an1ounted to only apparent authority which is equally 
binding upon the principal. 
CONCLUSION, POINT ONE 
All of the matters argued under this point were presented 
to the Supreme Court by the Defendant upon the prior appeal. 
46 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Defendant strenuous! y argued that there was no duty to 
release any of the mortgages until the 1949 account was paid 
in full. The Court's holding has previous! y been quoted ruling 
against the Defendant. The Defendant also argued that no 
demand had been made, that the Defendants had acted in good 
faith, and that the agents of the Defendant did not have 
authority. The Plaintiffs felt that the Court was searching for 
grounds for reversal because of the amount of the judgment, 
but found no substance in such arguments. Rather, a reversal 
was granted because the trial court had not distinguished 
between the parties, an issue raised for the first time on appeal. 
The Supreme Court, by its decision, knew that the case would 
be retired but did not feel constrained to pass upon those issues 
as raised by the Defendants. In fact, the Court felt compelled to 
emphasize the fact that none of the mortgages had been re-. 
leased, even though there was only approximately $6,000.00 
owing. The court stated as follows: 
((The Kellogg Company refused to finance the 
Nalders in 1952. At this time there were on record in 
favor of the Kellogg Company chattel mortgages ex-
ecuted by Nalder, Sr. and Jr. in 1949, 1950 and 1951, 
and real estate mortgages executed by Mr. and Mrs. 
Nalder in 1949 and 1950 totalling $107,401.92. Not 
one of the mortgages was ever released by the company 
until shortly before the instant case was filed in 1954, 
notwithstanding the fact that the 1949 deficit of some 
$6,000.00 was the only debt owing the company franz 
the Nalders/' 
Whether the mortgages had been paid, or satisfied by 
merger, whether there had been a demand, and whether the 
¢ defendant had acted in good faith, are all factual issues. They 
~ were all properly submitted to the jury with adequate instruc-
)· 
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tions. The jury's verdict on these issues is more than adequately 
sustained by substantial competent evidence. 
POINT TWO. PROXIMATE CAUSE 
THE JURY PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE DE-
FENDANT'S FAILURE TO RELEASE THE MORTGAGES 
WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S DAM-
AGE. (DEFENDANT'S POINT VI). 
The question of proximate cause is an issue for jury de-
termination. The Court properly submitted this issue to the 
jury with adequate instructions. The evidence justifying such 
submission and the determination thereon is as follows: 
1. At the end of 1951 the defendant had on record the 
following mortgages: 
Chattel Mortgages 
May 16, 1959 ______________________________ $24,000.00 
March 13, 1950 -------------------------- 23,300.00 
April 4, 1951 -------------------------------- 42,825.00 
Real Estate Mortgages 
February 14, 1949 ---------------------- 4,000.00 
April 1, 1950 --------------------.------------ 6, 721.80 
August 15, 1950 -------------------------- 6,555.12 
TotaL ___________________________ $1 07,401.92 
The effect upon a person's credit rating in having a mort-
gage of $6,5 55.12 of record as contrasted with mortgages of 
$107,401.92 is obvious. Recognizing the cautiousness of lending 
institutions, it would appear that the Court could take judicial 
notice that unreleased mortgages of $107,401.92 would be 
sufficient to so impair one's credit rating so as to prevent the 
securing of credit for future financing. 
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2. The Plaintiffs made application to Ralston Purina, 
General Mills, Sperry-Globe Mills, and to Farmers Grain 
Co-op., being most, if not all, of the feed companies operating 
in the Ogden area. Even though the salesman and field repre-
sentatives in each case recommended the approval of the ap-
plication, in all cases the applications were refused when sent 
in to the credit department (Tr. 96, 108, 505). 
3. On Dece~ber 7, 1951, an application was made to 
General Mills for turkey financing. The salesman, in writing 
up his report to the company, recommended that the applica-
tion be granted. On December 17, 1951, the credit manager 
dictated a memorandum to the salesman stating the Nalders 
V/Ould have to have Kellogg release the mortgages or secure 
a subordination agreement (Ex. F-4). 
Exhibit F-5 shows that General Mills wrote to the County 
Recorder of Davis County and in reply was advised of the 
three unreleased chattel mortgages as specified above. In Ex-
hibit F-6 an interoffice correspondence between the supervising 
credit manager at San Francisco to the credit manager at Ogden, 
it is stated as follows: 
((We certainly have mingled feelings about this one 
and while we have finally concluded to approve itJ we 
ask that you be satisfied on one or two points before 
actually proceeding to notify the grower. * * * * 
((It would be necessary that Kellogg Sales Company 
release the mortgage on the turkeys which are of rec-
ord-or they must be clearly subordinated in form of 
subordination acceptable to us, proper! y executed by 
Kellogg, and that subordination must be filed or re-
corded before we could proceed." (Emphasis added.) 
Other matters were mentioned in the letter which would 
have to be discussed and cleared up with the applicant. 
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Exhibit F-8 is a memorandum concerning a telephone con-
versation between the credit manager at Ogden and the ap-
plicant. In part, it stated as follows: 
((By telephone today, Mr. Nalder gave us the answer 
to the points brought out in Mr. J. S. Hall's letter of 
2-6-2 on the subject * * * Nalder still trying to get 
subordination from Kellogg and understands we would 
not finance without it." (Emphasis added.) 
It is clear from the foregoing that General Mills was 
willing to finance Plaintiffs provided the chattel mortgages 
were released or if it would subordinate its position to that of 
General Mills. 
4. Mr. Clair Rasmussen, a feed dealer at 0 gden repre-
senting Ralston-Purina Company, further testified that, after 
consultation with the credit department of his company, he 
advised the N alders that they had unreleased mortgages which 
would have to be cleared from the records of the County Re-
corder's office (Tr. 268-9). 
5. Robert Brown, credit manager for Ralston-Purina, tes-
tified that the Kellogg unreleased mortgages were a contribut-
ing cause for the refusal of the Plaintiffs' application (Tr. 483, 
492, 500). He further testified: 
uA. We \\70uld definitely '\Yant a chattel mortgage that 
anyone had covering turkeys. explicitly turkeys, 
we would "rant that mortgage released before we 
would enter into a contract with a grower as a 
turkey operation." (Tr. 499). 
6. It is clear that the representative of the defendants 
knew that the unreleased mortgages would prevent the securing 
of additional financing. Mr. Williams, the plant manager, after 
having his attention called to the fact that he had stated they 
were only relying on the real estate mortgage, and after being 
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asked if any attempt had been made to claim a lien on the 
turkeys raised during 1952, 195 3 and 1954, stated as follows: 
Q. Would your company loan money to a grower, 
where there is an outstanding chattel mortgage in 
favor of another company, which has a provision 
purporting to give a lien on turkeys which might 
be acquired in the future? 
(Discussion by counsel and court.) 
A. We would under certain circumstances. 
Q. Under what circumstances? 
A. If we had a subordination agreement with the other 
company, and the credit reputation and all other 
matters being satisfactory. 
Q. But you would insist upon either that they be re-
leased or a subordination agreement, would you not? 
A. Yes, we would." (Tr. 358 (a) 
7. Mr. Aust, the credit manager for Kellogg, knew that 
financing could not be secured as long as the mortgages were 
of record. In a letter dated December 22, 1952, to Mr. Nalder, 
he stated in part as follows: 
((As mentioned in our conference, upon receipt of 
these remittances we will be in a position to furnish 
you with a subordination agreement allowing you to 
secure turkey financing elsewhere inasmuch as our 
mortgage is still of record." (Emphasis added.) (Ex. 
D 21-5, App. 23). 
Mr. Aust testified that he knew that neither Kellogg nor 
any other large feed company would finance the Plaintiffs as 
long as the mortgages were of record. After reluctantly ad-
mitting that Kellogg would not have financed the N alders 
if some other company had unreleased mortgages of record, 
he testified as follows: 
Q. All right. You would insist then, as these other 
companies-like General Mills and Ralston-Purina 
-that they either be released as subordinated ? 
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A. If we were going to finance them, yes. 
Q. Have you had experience with any other large feed 
company? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Name the company, please. 
A. Orchard, Daniel, Midland Company. 
Q. Any others? 
A. No. That's the only one I have worked directly with. 
Q. Are you familiar with the policy of that company 
in making feed financing? 
A. They're pretty much the same as Kellogg. 
Q. Could we say then that they too would have insisted 
upon a release or discharge of these turkey chattel 
mortgages, before they would have financed? 
A. I would say yes." (Tr. 383). 
* * * * Q. Well, do these provisions in these turkey chattel 
mortgages, purport to give a lien on turkeys ac-
quired in the future, play any part in this require-
ment? 
A. I would say yes. 
Q. Isn't that an important factor? 
A. I believe it is, yes.'' (Tr. 384). 
It was conceded in the brief of the defendants that both 
General Mills and Ralston-Purina were insisting that Kellogg's 
chattel mortgages be released or a subordination agreement be 
secured before any financing could be granted to the Plaintiffs. 
On Page 10 it is stated: ttlt is conceded that one of the condi-
tions for approval was a release or subordination of Defendant's 
mortgages.'· On Page 12 it is stated: ttthat a release or subor-
dination of Defendant's mortgages would have been necessary 
in the event the application was accepted is not disputed." On 
Page 41 it is stated: celt is not disputed that one of the require-
ments made by General Mills was for a release or subordination 
of the debt owed to defendant., On Page 44 it is stated: uo£ 
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course, it was conceded that a release or subordination of 
defendant's mortgages would have been necessary to the ap-
proval of an application." 
8. Defendant repeatedly states that Plaintiffs had a poor 
reputation and credit rating. Support for this contention is 
claimed in connection with documents discussing the applica-
tion filed with General Mills. The fact is simply that the appli-
cation to General Mills would have been approved if a sub-
ordination agreement had been secured from Kellogg (Ex. F-6). 
Furthermore, the financial condition of the Plaintiffs was sub-
stantially the same as it had been during the three years that 
the Kellogg Company had been willing to finance them. Also 
direct letters from Plaintiffs' creditors gave them a high rating 
(Tr. 505-7). 
9. In addition to the Defendant failing to release the 
mortgages as required by law as constituting a proximate cause 
for the Plaintiffs' failure to secure financing, the Defendant 
took affirmative steps to further prevent the Plaintiffs from 
securing their necessary financing. They went out of their way 
to write officious letters (Exhibit F-10, App. 17) to Farmers 
Grain Cooperative, and apparently sent a copy of General Mills 
(Tr. 129). Further, the defendant volunteered information of 
a derogatory nature, more particularly, gave his personal 
opinion of the Plaintiffs, and stated that one of them was a 
troublemaker (Ex. G-10) (Tr. 417). 
10. The Defendant at the time of trial placed great em-
phasis before the jury upon the fact that there were numerous 
unreleased household and equipment chattel mortgages other 
than the mortgages of the defendant. It is submitted that none 
of these chattel mortgages purported to give a lien on after 
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acquired turkeys such as the defendant's mortgages. It was 
consistently stated by other credit men, in addition to the rep-
resentatives of the defendant, that a failure to release such 
other type chattel mortgages would not necessarily prohibit the 
approval of an application. In fact, Kellogg during the three 
years that it financed the Plaintiffs, did not insist upon any 
releases of these chattel mortgages, most of which were of 
record at that time. Mr. Williams testified that the Kellogg 
Company v1ould go ahead without demanding a release of 
chattel mortgages on furniture (Tr. 465). Both Mr. Aust, 
credit manager for Kellogg, and Mr. Brown, credit manager 
for Ralston-Purina, testified to the same effect (Tr. 385, 498). 
11. Defendant in its brief states that the Plaintiff tried the 
case on the theory that the Defendant's failure to release the 
mortgages was the sole proximate cause. Such is not the case. 
It has consistently been the position of the Plaintiffs that if the 
Defendant's failure to release the mortgages was a proximate 
cause under the usual definition or was a substantial factor in 
prohibiting the Plaintiffs from securing their financing, the 
burden of proof would have been sustained. The failure to 
release household-type chattel mortgages might have been a 
contributing cause also. However, the court properly instructed 
the jury that the la\v does not seek and recognize only one 
proximate cause of damage, and that the acts or omissions of 
two or more persons may work concurrently as an efficient cause 
of any injury, and each of the participating acts or omissions 
may be regarded in law as a proximate cause. 
12. On Page 42 of the defendant's brief it is stated that 
the application to General Mills would not have been ap· 
proved since a guarantee had not been obtained by a local feed 
54 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dealer. Mr. Robert Konrath, salesman for General Mills, testi-
fied that the necessary arrangements had been made to secure 
such guarantee. 
Proximate cause is established from the foregoing facts 
that all of the salesmen recommended approval; that all of the 
applications were turned down when sent to the credit depart-
ment; that tentative approval was given by General Mills, sub-
ject to release as subordination agreement; that the feed dealer 
for Ralston-Purina told the Plaintiffs the reason for the dis-
approval of their application was the unreleased mortgages; 
and the recognition on the part of both Willian1s and Aust 
and counsel for the Defendants that as long as the mortgages 
were unreleased additional financing would not be secured. 
As was stated in Malarkey v. O'Leary, 256 Pac. 521, 34 
Or. 493: 
t(An unsatisfied mortgage of record is constructive 
notice of the existence of a debt, and necessarily tends 
to injuriously affect the pecuniary standing and credit 
of the mortgagor. When it is paid, the statute has 
provided for its satisfaction on the record, so that the 
fact of payment may be known to the world. The 
reasonableness of the requirement is apparent. To in-
sure its observance, the mortgagee is required to ac-
knowledge the satisfaction of a mortgage, when paid, 
in as public a manner as the mortgagor had acknowl-
edged its existence, or suffer the statutory penalty. 
And it is no defense that the rnortgagor may be other-
wise indebted to the mortgagee.'' 
Without relying on all of the other evidence, it would 
appear to be sufficient to sustain the jury's finding of proxi-
mate cause that the two officers of the Defendant company 
acknowledged that the unreleased mortgages would prevent 
subsequent financing by other feed companies. These admissions 
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in addition to all the other evidence compels an affirmance 
of the jury's findings on this factual issue. 
POINT III-DAMAGES 
THE LAW AND EVIDENCE SUSTAIN THE JURY'S 
DETERMINATION OF DAMAGES (Defendant's Point IV). 
There is no serious dispute as to the rules of law cited 
by the defendant in its brief, wherein it is stated that damages 
for loss of profits must be proven with reasonable certainty, 
or that the damages ~ust be based upon some reasonable 
formula. The plaintiff does not agree that damages for loss 
of profits must always be established by proof of past experi-
ence. Usually this is the type of proof resorted to because there 
is nothing better. However, in this case, the plaintiff actually 
raised turkeys during the three years for which damages are 
claimed. These damages were based upon actual experience 
rather than resorting to something less definite, such as ex-
periences prior to the years for which loss of profits are claimed. 
If the damage is the certain result of the wrong of the 
defendants, and the damages can be shown with any reasonable 
certainty, the wrongdoer will not be heard to complain. In the 
leading case of Story Parchment Company vs. Patterson Parch-
ment Paper Company, 282 U.S. 555, 51 Sup. Ct. 248, 75 L. Ed. 
544, it is stated: 
"It is true that there 'vas uncertainty as to the extent 
of the damage, but there was none as to the fact of 
the damage; and there is a clear distinction between the 
measure of proof necessary to establish the fact that 
petitioner had sustained some damage and a measure 
of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix the amo~t. 
The Rule which precludes the recovery of uncertam 
damages applies to such as are not the certain result of 
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( 
¢ 
the wrong, not to those damages which are definite! y 
attributable to the wrong and only uncertain in respect 
of their amount. * * * 
c CWhere the tort itself is of such a nature, as to pre-
clude the ascertainment of the amount of damages with 
certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental prin-
ciples of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, 
and thereby relieve the wrongdoer frotn making any 
amend for his acts. In such case, while the damages 
may not be determined by mere speculation or guess, 
it will be enough if the evidence sho-vvs the extent of 
the damages, as a matter of just and reasonable infer-
ence, although the result be only approximate. The 
wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that they cannot 
be measured with the exactness and precision that would 
be possible if the case, in which he alone is responsible 
for making, were otherwise. (Citation of authorities). 
As the Supreme Court of Michigan has forcefully de-
clared, the risk of the uncertainty should be thrown 
upon the wrongdoers instead of upon the injured party." 
The plaintiffs assert there is no need to rely upon the fore-
going rule since the evidence of damage is shown with reason-
able certainty and is not based upon speculation or conjecture. 
The defendant, both in the Statement of Facts at Pages 7, 
10, and 12, and under Point IV on Page 36, argues strenuously 
that there is no evidence to support the contention that the 
plaintiffs would have raised 14,000 turkeys in each of the three 
years in question. Although there is substantial competent evi-
dence to support even a verdict computed upon 14,000 turkeys, 
it would seem to be a sufficient answer to point out that this 
is a factual question, and the jury apparently only awarded 
damages computed on 6,000 turkeys each year, which was the 
number raised during the last two years that the plaintiffs were 
financed by the defendant. Computations on 14,000 turkeys 
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resulted in a prayer for damages in the sum of $56,268.82, 
The jury only awarded a verdict of $22,030.61. 
1. The evidence reasonably shows that the plaintiffs had the 
facilities to raise in excess of 14,000 turkeys per year. Mr. Nal-
der, Sr. had facilities for raising 6,000 turkeys near his home. It 
was clearly established that his brooder house had a capacity to 
brood 6,000 poults. For the three years that the defendant 
financed the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs raised 5,000 the first year 
and 6,000 each of the last two years (Ex. A 1 & 2 and E 1.5). 
In addition to the facilities of Mr. Nalder, Sr., Mr. Nalder, 
Jr. had leased a 900-acre ranch east of Bountiful, Utah, from 
Deon Toone and had made arrangements for the use of the 
brooder house of Seth Oberg, which had a capacity to brood 
11,000 poults (Tr. 295). There was no evidence submitted 
by the defendant in any way refuting the foregoing evidence. 
2. The evidence sho~red that the plaintiffs intended to and 
would have raised 14,000 turkeys. 
Mr. Nalder, Jr. testified that he intended to raise 9,000 
turkeys (Tr. 305, 306). An application for financing 9,000 
turkeys was made by him to Farmers' Grain Co-op (Ex. H-1). 
In fact, 9,000 turkeys were ordered and delivery tendered 
( T r. 30 3) . Since financing had not been approved at the 
time of delivery, the turkeys \\~ere not placed in the rented 
brooder house, but rather 6,000 were placed in the brooder 
house of Mr. Nalder, Sr. and the additional 3,000 were turned 
over to another grower (Tr. 82 and 83). Mr. Nalder, Sr. 
\vas to receive his turkeys at a later date. When financing 
could not be secured, the 6,000 turkeys actually brooded were 
taken from him. 
In addition to the 9,000 ordered by Mr. Nalder, Jr., Mr. 
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Nalder, Sr. made application to ratse 5,000 turkeys on his 
ranch where 6,000 turkeys had been raised for each of the 
past two years. 
Since an application, order, and delivery of 9,000 turkeys 
had been made for the ranch east of Bountiful, and since an 
application had been made for 5,000 turkeys to be raised on 
the home ranch, the jury would have been justified in finding 
the plaintiffs intended to and had the facilities to raise 14,000 
turkeys. The defendant offered no testimony in any way re-
futing the foregoing evidence. 
3. In a normal loss of profits case involving the raising 
of turkeys, there would be considerable uncertainty as to the 
price which would have been paid for the turkeys, the price 
paid for feed, the number of turkeys which might have died, 
and the price at which the turkeys would have been sold. 
However, in this case such uncertainty was not present since 
the plaintiffs actually raised some turkeys in each of the 
years for which a loss is claimed. Thus, the purchase price, the 
cost of the feed, the mortality loss, and sales price was estab-
lished without any speculation as to whether the plaintiffs 
would have bought or sold when the market prices were up or 
~ 
down. 
When the plaintiffs could not secure financing from the 
feed companies, Mr. Rasmussen, a feed dealer in Ogden, co-
signed with the plaintiff at the First Security Bank, enabling 
him to raise a small herd of turkeys each year. The plaintiffs 
raised 1,018 turkeys in 1952, 1,430 turkeys in 1953, and 2,200 
turkeys in 1954. These amounts were taken into consideration 
in computing damages. 
Mr. N alder testified as to the amount paid for the turkeys, 
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feed, electricity, and a watchman. The amount for processing 
the turkeys at the end of the year is shown by the manifest 
sheet of the processing plant (Ex. L) . These amounts were 
summarized on Exhibit H-1, App. 33). The amounts actually 
received for the turkeys is shown by Exhibit L. From these 
facts the profit per bird was computed and the mortality rate 
established. 
In 1952 the plaintiffs sold 986 turkeys and would have 
lost 414 turkeys out of 14,000 based upon the established 
mortality rate of 3.1 per cent. These amounts were deducted 
from 14,000 leaving 12,300 turkeys to which the average profit 
of $1.86 per turkey was applied (Ex. N-1, App. 33). 
Similar computations were made for 1953 and 1954, 
based upon ledger sheets from the feed company and process-
ing plant (Ex. R, Q and I) and upon personal testimony (Tr. 
3 31) which even took into account taxes, insurance, and de-
preciation (Ex. N 1-4, App. 36). 
The foregoing evidence clearly established initial cost, 
maintenance and feeding expenses, sales price and expenses, 
and mortality rate. These amounts were then extended to show 
the actual loss of the plaintiffs by being denied the right to 
raise the number of turkeys for which they had ample facilities. 
Such evidence certainly presented to the jury a reasonable 
basis for determining the loss of the plaintiffs. It presented 
a much stronger case than one attempting to project loss of 
profits based upon past experience. Rather, it gave an index 
under actual conditions for each of the years and eliminated 
any speculation as to whether the plaintiffs would have sold 
their turkeys when the market price was higher and eliminated 
any speculation as to how many turkeys the plaintiffs would 
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have lost during the course of each year. The defendant intro-
duced no evidence whatsoever refuting the foregoing matters 
pertaining to damages. 
4. The plaintiffs introduced and the jury deducted amounts 
in mitigation of the damages. From the total amount of loss 
sustained for the three years was deducted the rent on the 
ranch, amounting to $3,600, which was not paid because the 
lease was cancelled. In addition, the salary received by William 
Nalder, Jr., for the period of time which he would have been 
spending his full time raising the turkeys was deducted, amount-
ing to $6,600 (Ex. N, App. 36). 
The defendant maintains that the sole and exclusive 
method of proving loss of profits is by projecting past perform-
ance. This is not the rule of law which is applicable. The rule 
is that damages must be proved with reasonable certainty. 
Past performance is the method normally used, but it is not 
exclusive. Other methods may be used, provided they comply 
with the requirement that damages are shown with some rea-
sonable certainty. 
In City of Corning vs. Iowa-Nebraska Light and Power 
Company, 225 Iowa 1380, 282 N.W. 791, the court held that 
the evidence of the first year's operations of a power plant 
could be used to establish the profits which would have been 
earned during the prior 11 months when the plant was not 
in operation due to conduct of the defendant. In so doing the 
court stated: 
((Defendants urge that because the Corning munici-
pal electric light, power and distributing system was 
a new business and had not been in operation or exist-
ence, that the loss of profits or loss of use of a plant 
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not in being yet is too speculative and uncertain to form 
a basis for recovery. 
We do not concur in this contention. * * * * 
Defendants insist that, conceding the plant was, in 
effect, an established business, the profits sought to 
be recovered as damages are too speculative, remote 
a.nd uncertain to permit recovery and are not suscep-
tible to legal proof. The rule against certain damages 
applies where there is uncertainty as to the cause of 
the damages and as to the fact of legal damages. The 
damages claimed must be the certain result of the 
alleged breach on which the injured party relied. If 
the damages are the result of the breach, the fact that 
the amount of the damages is uncertain or difficult to 
determine does not prevent recovery of the amount of 
the damages if the amount of the damages can be estab-
lished with reasonable certainty * * * * . 
The trial court was able to determine from the 
evidence the net earnings of the plant the first year 
of operation and there was sufficient evidence to sup-
port the findings of the trial court that the earnings 
during the preceding 11 month period \\~ould have 
been substantially the same. The cause \\Tas tried to 
the court without a jury and, there being evidence to 
sustain the findings of fact of a trial court, they are 
binding and conclusive on this court." 
In Caspery v. Moore, 70 P. 2d 224, 21 Cal. App. 694, it is 
stated that evidence of profits both past and present is ad-
missible in detern1ining the an1ount of prospective profits. In 
DeWiner v. Nelson, 33 P. 2d 356, 54 Idaho 560, it was held 
that the evidence that the plaintiff made daily computations 
of costs and determined the average daily profit for feeding 
each man \vas con1petent to prove loss of anticipated profits. 
Relying upon the authorities cited by the defendant, it 
is subtnitted that the evidence in this case does establish a rea-
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sonable formula or basis for computing the damages or that 
the damages have been shown with reasonable certainty. If 
exact certainty has not been established, the defendant cannot 
be heard to complain. Again quoting from the leading case 
of Story Parchment Company vs. Patterson Parchment Paper 
Company, supra, decided by United States Supreme Court: 
"To deny the injured party the right to recover any 
actual damages in such cases, because they are of such 
a nature v1hich cannot be thus certainly measured, 
would be to enable parties to profit by, and speculate 
upon, their own wrongs, encourage violence and invite 
trepidation. Such is not, and cannot be, the law * * * 
and the adoption of any arbitrary rule in such a case, 
which will relieve the wrongdoer from any part of the 
damages, and throw the loss upon the injured party, 
would be little less than legalized robbery. 
((Whatever of uncertainty there may be in this mode 
of estimating damages, is an uncertainty caused by 
the defendant's own wrongful act; and justice and 
sound public policy alike require that he should bear 
the risk of the uncertainty thus produced.'' 
The court also quoted from another case discussing this 
question wherein it was stated: 
((Certainty, it is true, would thus be attained; but it 
would be the certainty of injustice." 
POINT IV 
THE COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT H. WILLIAM 
NALDER, SR. AND JR. WERE PARTNERS AND, THERE-
FORE, THE JUDGMENT IN BOTH OF THEIR NAMES 
IS PROPER. (Defendant's Points I and III (d) . 
From the time the pleadings were first filed, through the 
first trial, and again on the retrial, the defandant did not 
challenge that these plaintiffs were partners. Only on appeal 
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is such issue raised. This procedure is used to entrap the trial 
court and to reserve a ground for appeal. The Supreme Court 
in the prior decision assumed that the plaintiffs were not, in 
fact, partners and treated them separately in granting a re-
versal. Then again on the second trial the defendant conceded 
that Nalder, Sr. and Jr. were partners. Concerning this issue, 
the following took place at the time of retrial: 
"MR. BUSHNELL: It's a question of a partnership 
between two of them. We would like to show they joint-
ly procured the money for setting up the physical plant. 
MR. BOWEN: There is no issue on the partnership, 
your Honor. 
MR. BUSHNELL: Are you willing to admit, for 
the purpose of this record, that Bill Nalder, Jr. and Mr. 
Nalder, Sr., were partners in the instigation and raising 
of these turkeys ? 
MR. BOWEN: I have always so contended that they 
were. Surely I'll admit it. 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 
MR. BUSHNELL: I won't spend any further time 
on it." (Tr. 25 and 26). 
Now again on appeal the defendant would assert the 
parties should be treated separately. 
There is no question but what Nalder, Sr. and Jr~, were 
partners and the defendant so treated them. The evidence con-
cerning this matter is as follows: 
1. In Paragraph 7 of the answer and counterclaim, the 
defendant alleged as follows: 
''Defendant alleges that all of the real estate and 
chattel mortgages referred to in said First Cause ~£ 
Action were made, executed and delivered by the satd 
plaintiffr to the defe11dant as part of the fina~cing pro-
gran/ of the defendants who were engaged zn the tur-
key 1·ai.ring business.'' 
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2. The defendant company relied on the real estate mort-
gage as security on all obligations of all the plaintiffs. An 
excerpt from the mortgage states: 
((This mortgage shall secure all other sums due and 
to become due from H. Willia1n Nalder, Sr. and Cath-
erine Nalder, his wife, and H. William Nalder, Jr. 
and Mrs. William Nalder, Jr., his wife, in favor of 
Kellogg Sales Company." 
3. Exhibit J-5 is a proposed forn1 of partnership agree~ 
ment for the formation of a partnership between Nalder, Sr. 
and two of his sons. Since one of the sons v1ithdrew before 
active operations, the agreement was not signed. However, 
Nalder Sr. and Jr. testified that the terms of the agreement 
were carried out between him and his father. 
4. The title to the real property upon which a brooder 
house was constructed was in both names, and mortgages 
granted thereon were signed by all of the parties thereto (Ex. 
J-4, 5, 6, 7). 
The defendant maintains that the prior decision in this 
case would prohibit the parties from showing the continuation 
of the partnership after they were unable to procure financing 
from the defendant and after Nalder Jr., in order to mitigate 
damages, sought employment elsewhere. By the very terms 
of the decision, it is clear that the court did not know what 
the factual situation was in this regard. The court stated as 
follows: 
((The record is not clear as to whether the turkey rais-
ing activities in 1952, 195 3 and 1954 were a joint oper-
ation of Nalder, Sr. and Mrs. Nalder, or whether 
limited to Nalder, Sr." 
To clarify this point in the record, additional evidence 
was submitted concerning the status of the parties at this time. 
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The defendant has asserted that this amounts to a repudiation 
of prior testimony. It is submitted that there is not one phase 
of this testitnony which is inconsistent with any prior testimony 
in either trial, but rather it is an amplification of an issue not 
previously contested but made pertinent by virtue of the 
Supreme Court's decision. It is claimed that Nalder, Jr., 
abandoned the raising of turkeys after 1952, and the defendant 
further asserts that the prior decision v1ould prohibit any 
evidence in this matter. Again quoting from that decision, it 
is submitted that the holdings do not sustain the defendant's 
contention. The court stated with reference to Nalder, Jr.: 
ttl\Tor can he recover damages beyond the period when 
he actually engaged in, or tried to engage in, the turkey 
business." 
This statement is again based upon the assumption that 
Nalder, Sr. and Jr., were not, in fact, partners. That the de-
fendant Nalder, Jr., would have continued raising turkeys is 
supported by the following evidence: 
1. The parties had invested approximately $20,000 in the 
brooder house and equipment for a full-scale and continued 
operation in the turkey business (Tr. 308). 
2. The defendant Nalder Jr. had leased a 900-acre ranch 
east of Bountiful, Utah, for a period of three years, expiring 
in 1953 with the option to renew on the same terms for an 
additional period of three years ( T r. 294, Ex. J 8) . 
3. The plaintiffs had purchased a tractor and combine, 
and planted grain on this ranch (Tr. 304). 
4. In addition to the lease, the plaintiff was acquiring 
one spike-tooth harrow, one three-bottom gang plow, one 
grain drill, one six-foot tractor, and incidental tools (Tr. 
294-5). 
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5. The parties testified that the partnership had never 
been terminated and during the three years in question Nalder, 
Jr. assisted with the turkeys on each week-end and two or three 
times during the week (Tr. 292-3, 311). 
By law the plaintiffs are required to mitigate the damages. 
Nalder, Jr., could not have refused to seek employtnent else-
·where and sought to charge that additional loss to the de-
fendants. Since he was required and did seek employn1ent 
elsewhere and has deducted the amount he received in their 
claim for damages against the defendant, the defendant should 
not be permitted to rely upon this fact to attempt to defeat 
recovery as to Nalder, Jr. 
The defendant next asserts that a distinction should be 
made as to the parties on the real estate mortgage in the 
instructions to the jury because of the highly penal nature of 
the section pertaining to the release of real estate mortgages. 
It should be pointed out that the court did not instruct the 
jury concerning any penalty damages. This issue was decided 
summarily in favor of the defendant. At the defendant's in-
sistence and objections, the trial court refused to grant any 
instructions concerning penalty damages or to even permit 
the submission of a special interrogatory on the question of 
v1hether failure to release the real estate mortgages would 
amount to an independent concurring proximate cause. Since 
no penalty was involved, this assertion by the defendant cannot 
be maintained. 
It is fundamental that partners cannot sue for their pro-
portionate share of any amounts owing to a partnership. It is 
equally fundamental that suit may be brought by all of the 
partners or in the partnership name. In this case all of the 
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partners are joined as parties plaintiff and no attempt has 
been made by them or by the trial court to apportion the amount 
of the judgment or among the parties plaintiff, except by stipu-
lation and instruction to the jury Mrs. Nalder was eliminated 
as a partner. By law all of the parties were required to be 
parties plaintiff and therefore there was no reason for the 
trial court to distinguish between Nalder, Sr. and Nalder, Jr. 
in computing the amount of damages. The Uniform Partner-
ship Act states that the act of a partner is the act of the partner-
ship. Section 9 of the Uniform Partnership Act, being Section 
48-1-6 U.C.A. 1953, states as follows: 
( (Partner Agent of Partnership as to Partnership 
Business. 
(I) Every partner is an agent of the partnership for 
the purpose of its business, and the act of every partner, 
including the execution in the partnership name of any 
instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual 
way the business of the partnership of which he is a 
member binds the partnership, unless the partner so 
acting has in fact no authority to act for the partnership 
in the particular matter, and the person with whom he 
is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no 
such authority.'' 
It is fundamental that inactive partners will be held 
liable for the act of other partners and it therefore follows that 
they are entitled to treat the act of a partner as the act of the 
partnership in any determinations to amounts owing to the 
partnership. 
The record is clear that the parties had the facilities to 
raise the turkeys claimed and in fact attempted to secure the 
necessary financing to raise the number of turkeys for which 
damages were awarded. It was only after they had been pre-
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vented from securing the necessary financing that Nalder, Jr., 
discontinued raising turkeys and sought other employment. 
Any remuneration received from this other employment was 
deducted in mitigation of damages. The defendant as the 
wrongdoer should not be permitted to benefit from the fact 
that it forced Nalder, Jr. from the turkey-raising business. 
But for the conduct of the defendant, Nalder, Jr., with his 
father would have raised turkeys during all of the years in 
question. The law required the parties to mitigate damages 
and should not now penalize them for so doing. 
POINTV. 
THE COURT PROPERLY: 
(a) RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE EXHIBITS I-1, 1-2, 
Q, R, & N 1-4 (Defendant's Point V) 
(b) DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR DI-
RECTED VERDICT, JUDGMENT NOTWITH-
STANDING VERPICT, OR FOR NEW TRIAL 
(Defendant's Point IX) 
(c) INSTRUCTED THE JURY AND REFUSED CER-
TAIN OF DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTIONS (Defendant's Point X) 
(d) DISALLOWED ITEMS ON DEFENDANT'S COST 
BILL ON APPEAL (Defendant's Point XI) 
THE COURT PROPERLY: 
(a) RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE EXHIBITS I-1, I-2, 
Q, R, AND N 1-4 (Defendant's Point V) 
The defendant in its brief quoted only part of the testi· 
mony concerning the foundation for the admissibility of Ex-
hibits 1-1 and 2. After the testimony contained in defendant's 
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brief, the counsel for the defendant asked the witness questions 
on voir dire and established that the record was prepared by 
the bookkeeper of the Lee Brown Company. It further ap-
peared that said document was maintained as a part of the 
regular business entries of that company (Tr. 36). As to 
Exhibit I-2, it was likewise testified that it was a document 
which was kept in the usual course of the business transactions 
of the company (Tr. 37-9). It is respectfully submitted that 
with such a foundation the exhibits were properly admitted 
as an exception to the hearsay rule as a business entry. How-
ever, the documents were not received at that time, but were 
later admitted, the court stating as follows: 
t (The stipulati9n this morning was that those exhibits 
may be received in evidence. They will be received" 
Tr. 328). 
As to Exhibits Q and R, they were processing sheets listing 
the exact number of turkeys, grade, vveight, boxes, etc., the 
original being given to the plaintiff and a copy maintained 
by the processor. These documents were used to establish the 
amount of processing charges paid by the defendant. He testi-
fied that these sheets were the documents used for settling 
with Lee Brown, which is equivalent to his stating that he 
paid the amount specified thereon for processing charges. Cer-
tain! y the plaintiff is qualified to state the amount of expenses 
paid by him in connection with the raising of his turkeys. 
As to Exhibits N 1-4, they merely amount to a tabulation 
and computation of the an1ounts claimed by the plaintiffs. All 
of the essential elements contained on each of those documents 
were otherwise independently received as evidence as being 
ledger sheets from the feed company's records, processing 
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sheets, purchasing records, etc., and the personal testimony 
of the plaintiffs (Tr. 331-3). Said documents were not relied 
upon to establish the actual facts therein contained, but rather 
as a summary of other facts properly admitted which would 
enable the court and jury to follow the contentions of the 
plaintiffs. That such a procedure is proper is supported by the 
following cases: 
((Where voluminous documents are a necessary part 
of evidence in a cause, tabulation of the documents in 
the form of charts and schedules may be introduced 
for aid of the trier of the facts." Augustine v. Bowles, 
149 F. 2d 93. 
((Where books and documents are multifarious and 
of a character rendering it difficult for the court or 
jury to com prebend the facts without schedules, the 
court may admit schedules verified by testimony of 
persons making them." Michigan Bankers Association 
vs. Ocean Accident and Guaranty Corp., 264 N.W. 
868, 274 Mich. 470. 
It is further held that admission of maps and charts in 
evidence ((is largely a matter of the trial court's discretion, 
not to be disturbed by appellate courts, unless abuse of dis-
cretion is shown." Babcock vs. Gray, 107 P. 2d 846, 165 Ore. 
398. 
THE COURT PROPERLY: 
(b) DEI\TIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DI-
RECTED VERDICT, JUDGMENT NOTWITH-
STANDING VERDICT, OR FOR NEW TRIAL 
(Defendant's Point IX) 
The defendant, in arguing its Point IX, merely summarizes 
its contentions and arguments as made in other points in the 
brief; more particularly, a generalized statement is made that 
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the defendant did not destroy the credit of the plaintiffs, that 
the defendant had the right to maintain all its mortgages of 
record, and there was no proof of proximate cause, demand, 
or. lack of good faith, and that damages had not been shown, 
but rather were speculative, uncertain and incompetent. It is 
submitted that all of the foregoing were factual issues which 
• 
were properly presented to the jury with adequate and sufficient 
instructions and, under proper rules of appellate practice, such 
verdict must be sustained. 
THE COURT PROPERLY: 
(c) INSTRUCTED THE JURY AND REFUSED CER-
TAIN OF DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTIONS (Defendant's Point X) 
As to most of the instructions claimed to have been given 
in error, the defendant makes a cross-reference to other places 
in the brief where the factual or legal issue is argued. However, 
in addition to these assignments of error, the defendant claims 
that the most grievous error in this regard was the trial court's 
granting of Instructions No. 16 and 18. Instruction No. 16 
advises the jury that for them to find the defendant's conduct 
was the proximate cause they need not find that it was the sole 
proximate cause. Instruction No. 18 advises the jury that if 
the wrongful acts of two or more persons were committed 
independently and contributed concurrently as proximate 
causes, each person could be liable. These instructions were 
proper in form, having been copied from the California Ap-
proved Jury Instructions, being Instructions No. 104-A and 
104-B. The main contention of the defendant seems to be that 
the instructions were not applicable to the facts of this case. 
The defendant states (tthat there was no evidence of any wrong 
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or act committed by a third party which, acting concurrently 
with the acts of defendant, jointly caused damages to plain-
tiffs. (Page 56). 
At the time of trial, the defendant placed considerable 
emphasis on the fact that there were numerous unreleased 
household-type chattel mortgages which like,vise may have 
contributed to the denial of the application made by the plain-
tiffs. Not only by cross-examination were these factors greatly 
emphasized (Tr. 157-170) but counsel for the defendant read 
into the record some 18 such mortgages (Tr. 472-5). The 
various credit men from General Mills and Ralston-Purina, 
in addition to Mr. Aust, the credit manager for the defendant, 
stated that unreleased household chattel mortgages would not 
necessarily prohibit the approval of applications, since they 
did not purport to give a lien on after acquired turkeys. In 
fact, the defendant had financed the plaintiffs for three years 
during which time most of these chattel mortgages were still 
of record. Nevertheless, the defendant, having raised the 
issue of the conduct of other persons in failing to have mort-
gages released, presented a factual issue upon which the court 
was required to instruct the jury. That is to say, the issue had 
been raised as to what effect should be given to the failure 
of the H. A. Company to release its chattel mortgages even 
though they had been paid, as testified by a representative 
of that company (Tr. 274-281). The instructions as given 
properly instructed the jury that if the conduct of the defendant 
was a proximate cause, being a substantial factor contributing 
to the damage of the plaintiffs, the fact that other persons 
or causes may also have been a contributing factor would not 
relieve the defendant from liability. The defendant is not 
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stating the true facts when it states in its brief on Page 59, 
CCThere is absolutely no evidence of any wrong committed 
by any third party." Such evidence was clearly introduced and 
presented by the defendant. 
Objection was also made to Instruction No. 19 which stated 
that notice to Schinker and Aust of a demand for release of 
the mortgages was notice to the defendant. No contention 
was made by the defendant that said agents did not have 
authority to at least receive demands for release of mortgages. 
Rather, the defendant maintained that they had no authority 
to release the mortgages. This was not the issue presented by 
Instruction No. 19. Rather, it was limited to the effect that such 
agents could receive demands for release of mortgages and 
convey them to a representative of the company having author-
ity to either release or refuse to release said mortgages. The 
record shows that this procedure was, in fact, followed and 
Mrs. Schinker advised Mr. Williams that the release of the 
mortgages had been discussed and requested advice from him 
as to whether releases should be granted. She was advised by 
Mr. Williams that the mortgages were not to be released (Tr. 
342). 
The defendant complains because the jury was not in-
structed that the filing of the suit by the plaintiffs created no 
inference that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. It is 
implicit in the instructions as a whole that such was the case 
and there can be no complaint of prejudicial error by the court's 
refusal to grant such instructions. 
The other claimed errors in the giving or refusing to give 
certain instructions are argued in other points in both briefs. 
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THE COURT PROPERLY: 
(d) DISALLOWED ITEMS ON DEFENDANT'S COST 
BILL ON APPEAL (Defendant's Point XI) 
The defendant argues that it was error for the trial court, 
in retaxing costs, to disallow a premium of $682.84 paid for 
a supersedeas bond. Rule 73 (d), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, states that the appellant, if he so desires1 may present 
to the court for its approval a supersedeas bond. It will be 
noted that this is only permissive, and may be resorted to if 
the appellant so desires. It is not required, nor is it mandatory, 
for the purpose of perfecting the appeal. 
In an annotation entitled ((Taxable Costs and Disburse-
ments as Including Premiums Paid on Bonds Incident to Steps 
Taken in Action," 81 A.L.R. 1532, it is stated as follows: 
((At common law, costs were unknown, were not 
recoverable, and were not adjudged in the judgment of 
the court. It is said to be a general rule that common law 
courts have no inherent power to award costs, which 
can be granted to either party in any cause or pro-
ceeding only by virtue of express statutory authority; 
and that for courts of law to allow or apportion costs, it 
is necessary to point to some specific provision of the 
statute giving the right. And such statutory provisions 
are to be construed strictly. 7 R.C.L. 781, 782. 
((The practice of employing surety companies to fur-
nish bonds in judicial proceedings is of comparatively 
recent origin. In most instances the courts were dis-
inclined to hold that the premiums paid for such bonds 
were included in the language of a general statute 
providing for the taxation as costs of the disbursements 
necessarily incurred in the action." 
In 14 Am. Jur. 36, Costs, Section 60, Premiums on Bonds, 
it is stated: 
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'(The general rule seems to be that in the absence of 
statutory authority, the premium paid for a bond given 
in a pending action may not be taxed as costs therein." 
Rule 54 (d) ( 3) and the case cited by the defendant do 
not specifically discuss the awarding of premiums on bonds as 
costs. Neither Rule 54-3 (d) discussing the awarding of costs 
on appeal nor Rule 73 (d) specifically dealing with supersedeas 
bonds specify that premiums may be awarded as taxable costs. 
Consequent! y, in view of the foregoing law, it would appear 
that costs for said premium may not be taxed against the 
plaintiffs. The bond was procured for the convenience of the 
defendant and was not required to perfect the appeal. 
CROSS-APPEAL 
POINT VI. THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE 
JURY SHOULD BE DOUBLED PURSUANT TO SECTION 
.57-3-.8, U.C.A. 1953. 
POINT VII. THE COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED 
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON DEFENDANT'S COUNTER-
CLAIM. 
POINT VI-ARGUMENT 
THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE JURY SHOULD 
BE DOUBLED PURSUANT TlO SECTION 53-3-8, U.C.A. 
1953. 
In the decision on the prior appeal, the Supreme Court 
stated as follows: 
((One whose credit is damaged by the wrongful fail-
ure to release both real estate and chattel mortgages 
may, in exceptional cases, be able to satisfactorily prove 
elements of damages proximately caused by a particular 
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unreleased mortgage. In such case, damages should be 
awarded under the particular statute applicable." 
Having this statement in mind, the plaintiff requested 
the court to give the following instruction: 
Requested Instruction No. 11 
!(If, adhering to the Court's instruction, you find that 
the defendant wrongfully failed to release real estate 
mortgages as contrasted to chattel mortgages and such 
failure in and of itself was a proximate cause of dam-
age, then you are instructed to return a verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff in double the amount of actual damages 
determined by you to have been caused by such failure. 
If you do not find that such a failure to release real 
estate mortgages alone amounted to a proximate cause 
of damages but that such failure along with a wrongful 
failure to release chattel mortgages jointly were a 
proximate cause of damage, then you are instructed to 
return a verdict for the plaintiff for actual damages 
sustained, plus $50.00 punitive damages" (R. 42). 
Without giving effect to the prior decision as quoted 
above, the defendant prevailed upon the trial court that said 
instruction should be refused, relying upon this additional 
statement made by the Supreme Court in the prior decision: 
((The court should apply the rule that when either 
of two statutory penalties is equally applicable to 
a given set of facts, the lesser of such penalties must 
be applied." 
It is submitted that reliance upon this statement alone, 
without considering the context in which it was stated, gives 
an erroneous interpretation to the court's prior decision. After 
the court had refused to give Instruction No. 11, the plaintiffs 
requested the submission of a special interrogatory as contained 
in requested Instruction 8 (R. 39). The interrogatory to be 
answered, as requested in said instruction, was as follows: 
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ctDid the defendant wrongfully fail to release real 
estate mortgages, which failure proximately damaged 
the plaintiffs?" 
By such answer, either the trial court or the Supreme Court 
would have been in a position to rule as a matter of law whether 
double damages should be applied. Again the defendant 
prevailed upon the trial court that such an answer was not 
required in view of the Supreme Court's prior decision. It is 
submitted that this was error and an abuse of discretion on the 
part of the trial court. If the jury had answered the interrogatory 
in the negative, there would have been no purpose for any 
further argument. If they had answered the interrogatory in 
the affirmative, the issue would be squarely presented as to 
the earlier decision; and, since the jury would have found the 
factual issue that failure to release the real estate mortgage 
was also a proximate cause in and of itself, the court would 
be in a position to assess the damages. Since the defendant 
prevented a determination on this factual issue and the jury 
found that failure to release both real estate and chattel 
mortgages were the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' damage, 
it now must be presumed that failure to release real estate 
mortgages was also a proximate cause and, therefore, damages 
must be doubled. 
There is no support for the court's statement: 
nThe Court should apply the rule that when either 
of two statutory penalties is equally applicable to a 
given set of facts, the lesser of such penalties must be 
applied." 
Attempt to find authority supporting such a statement has 
been unsuccessful. The statement is that when either of two 
statutory penalties is equally applicable. It would appear 
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that if either statutory penalty is equally applicable, then 
the Court should not disregard legislative intent and the jury 
should be free to apply either or both penalties as they may 
find the issues. If there is uncertainty as to whether failure 
to release the real estate mortgages was an independent con-
curring cause, then there would be some justification for apply-
ing the lesser of the two penalties. Stating it differently, if 
failure to release the real estate mortgages was not in and of 
itself sufficient to cause the damages alleged but that failure 
to release such mortgages together with failure to release 
chattel mortgages operated as concurrent causes, the lesser 
penalty should be applied; but if the jury concludes that either 
one acting separately or independently was sufficient to cause 
the damages and therefore were ((equally applicable" there 
does not appear to be any authority requiring application of 
the lesser of the two penalties. 
Statutes imposing penalties serve a proper and legitimate 
purpose well within the province of the legislature to enact 
as is stated in 23 Am. Jur. 627, as follows: 
((The statutes of nearly every state of the Union 
provide for the increase of damage where the injury 
complained of results from the neglect of duties im-
posed for the better security of life and property, and 
make that increase in many cases double and in some 
cases treble and even quadruple the actual damages. 
Experience favors this legislation as the most efficient 
mode of preventing, with the least inconvenienc~, the 
commission of in juries. The decisions of the htghest 
courts have affirmed the validity of such legislation." 
By holding that where the statutory penalties are equally 
applicable the lesser must be applied, this court abrogates legis-
lative enactments in contravention of prior cases recognizing a 
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contrary rule of construction. In Chatwin vs. Terry, 107 U. 
340, 153 P. 2d 941, it is stated: 
( (In construing statutes such as here it is the duty of 
this Court to give meaning to each and to reconcile 
them in such a manner as to carry out the reasonable 
and practical intention of the legislature." 
In Smith vs. American Packing and Provision Company, 
102 U. 351, 130 P. 2d 951, it is stated: 
('In Cuckle v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co., 61 
Utah 559, 216 P. 684, 685, this court said: (But it is 
not to be presumed that the legislature would enact a 
vain and meaningless statute. We conceive it to be our 
duty, if possible, to adopt that interpretation which 
will give effect to each provision and harmonize them 
with each other, so that neither will be meaningless." 
The verdict of the jury assessing damages should be 
doubled as required by the legislature. 
POINT VII. THE COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED 
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON DEFENDANT'S COUNTER-
CLAIM. 
The defendant counterclaimed for the amount owing rep-
resenting the deficiency for 1949 in addition to attorneys' fees 
as specified in the promissory note. At no time was there any 
issue or contest concerning the obligation for the deficiency 
to the defendants. The extended trial was concerned solely 
with the items alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint. Neverthe-
less, the defendant called Mr. Quinney to testify concerning 
reasonable attorneys' fees to be awarded in the matter, and 
Mr. Quinney's testimony was based upon the extended trial 
when he stated that a fee of $750 was not nearly adequate 
and would not be the only fee charged in the matter (Tr. 43 7) · 
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Since there was no issue as to the amount owing for the 
1949 deficiency and therefore no litigation was involved con-
cerning said amount, and since as determined by the jury the 
defendants in fact owed the plaintiffs more than the amount 
of the counterclaim, it is submitted that the defendant is not 
entitled to an award of $750 for attorneys' fees in this case. 
In a recent annotation entitled (<Recovery of Attorneys' 
Fees Provided for in Bill, Note, or Similar Evidence of In-
debtedness as Affected by Opposing Recovery," 41 A.L.R. 2d 
677, a summary of the law is stated as follows: 
(<While there is some divergence of opinion, the 
majority of the courts which have weighed the question 
agree that where the defendant in an action on a note 
or similar evidence of indebtedness containing a pro-
vision for the payment of attorney's fees, recovers on 
a counterclaim, or the like, in an amount in excess of 
the amount due on the note for principal and interest, 
the plaintiff is not entitled to recover such fees. * * * * 
This rule appears to be founded on the reasoning that, 
the holder of the note being indebted to the defendant 
maker in a greater amount than the sum due on the 
note, the note is substantially paid * * * * " 
Based upon the foregoing authority, the awarding of at-
torneys' fees to the defendant on its counterclaim cannot be 
sustained. 
~ONCLUSION 
This appeal is predicated primarily upon a factual dispute. 
The plaintiffs having been awarded a verdict by the jury, is 
entitled to have this court review the record to determine if 
there is competent evidence to support the findings of the 
jury. Not only is there sufficient, competent evidence to sustain 
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that determination; but rather, evidence would have to be 
ignored to rule as a matter of law that all reasonable persons 
would conclude that the plaintiffs have not sustained their 
case. The duty to release mortgages upon satisfaction is speci-
fied by the Legislature. The jury found that all of the mort-
gages, except the last real estate mortgage, had been satisfied 
either by payment or by express merger into said mortgage. 
The existence of unreleased mortgages, totalling $107,401.92 
as contrasted to a mortgage of $6,550.12, clearly supports a 
finding that plaintiffs' credit rating was so impaired that they 
could not secure financing to enable them to continue in their 
chosen business. Their maximum investment and endeavor 
was rendered useless. The jury's determination of damages 
is based upon actual experience not usually found in a loss 
of profits case. Since 1884 the law in Utah has provided that 
a defendant who fails to release a mortgage after it has been 
satisfied must pay double lhe actual damages caused by such 
failure. A legal wrong has been done to plaintiffs. The pos-
sible magnitude of such wrong was recognized by the legislature 
when it set out the penalty of double damages. Irrespective 
of the statute, punitive damages may be awarded where a 
v.rrongful act is done with a bad motive or with negligence 
amounting to positive misconduct, or in a manner evidencing 
a willful disregard of the rights of others. The anguish suffered 
by plaintiffs in their vain attempt to continue in their chosen 
business cannot be put aside lightly. They were but puppets 
in the hands of defendant who held the purse strings; and who, 
in that position of power, manifested a conscious disregard 
of the rights of the plaintiffs, and a reckless indifference to 
the consequences of their acts. Defendant's action was so willful 
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and done with such wanton disregard that an award of punitive 
damages is more than justified. 
The fundamental issue is whether the defendant company 
may curtail a farmer's ability to remain in business. Does the 
defendant company have the right to coerce payments by lightly 
disregarding its statutory duties, with full knowledge that 
such business practices make it impossible for the farmer to 
earn a livelihood in a business of his own choice? The Legisla-
ture did not so intend; the jury did not so find. This Court 
should not nullify that legislative intent nor overthrow that 
factual determination. Not only should the jury's verdict be 
affirmed, but in addition the amount of that verdict should be 
doubled and the award of attorneys' fees on defendant's 
counterclaim should be disallowed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAN S. BUSHNELL 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Respondents 
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